인도와 대한민국은 왜 해양협력을 제도화해야 하는가

The April 2026 India–Republic of Korea (ROK) Summit in New Delhi reaffirmed a deepening partnership between two vibrant democracies with convergent Indo‑Pacific visions. In their Joint Strategic Vision, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and ROK President Lee Jae Myung emphasised shared democratic values and a commitment to a rules‑based maritime order. As India’s Prime Minister noted that the ROK views India as a central pillar of its “pragmatic diplomacy”. Likewise, the Joint Vision states that both countries advocate a “free, open, peaceful and prosperous Indo‑Pacific” governed by international law. India’s Act East policy and Korea’s New Southern Policy and its Indo-Pacific Strategy (2022) thus converge on ensuring freedom of navigation, unimpeded commerce, and regional stability. It is observed that both nations share “a growing dependence on seaborne trade” and a “shared commitment to freedom of navigation and unimpeded commerce in the open seas”. This strategic alignment undergirds why the bilateral maritime momentum has moved beyond episodic projects: both see each other as key partners in a peaceful, inclusive Indo‑Pacific.

Economic and Strategic Complementarity

Trade and investment form the bedrock of India–ROK ties. Bilateral trade has grown rapidly, passing US$21.5 billion in 2018 and oscillating around $27–28 billion in recent years, with a formal target of $50 billion by 2030. To achieve this, both sides agreed to resume and accelerate negotiations to upgrade their 2010 CEPA trade pact. The summit also established a new India–ROK Economic Security Dialogue to deepen supply‑chain resilience and technology cooperation. High-level visits have become routine. PM Modi and President Lee met on the G7 and G20 sidelines in 2025 and leaders now plan annual summit‑level meetings and expanded ministerial dialogues. These institutionalised channels, including a first‑ever Finance Minister and Foreign Minister Joint Commission, keep the dialogue sustained.

Economically, India and Korea have highly complementary strengths. Korea boasts cutting‑edge manufacturing, electronics and naval technology; India offers a large and growing market, abundant skilled labour and strategic geography. For example, Indian engineers and workers supply an estimated seafarer pool of over 320,000 individuals, supporting its 13 major ports and 11,098 km coastline. Yet India’s shipyards currently produce under 1% of global output, far below its maritime needs. By contrast, Korea accounts for roughly 25% of global shipbuilding tonnage (second only to China’s 47% share. Korea’s major yards (HD Hyundai, Samsung Heavy, Hanwha Ocean) have order books stretching to 2028, while India’s advanced naval yards (e.g. Mazagon, GRSE) lack large‑scale civilian capacity. Korea’s firms have already begun strategic tie‑ups: in July 2025. HD Hyundai’s holding arm signed an MOU with Cochin Shipyard to collaborate across the shipbuilding value chain. Industry analysts note that “for ROK and Japanese shipbuilders encountering increased competition from China, collaborating with shipbuilding companies in India provides an additional manufacturing location and access to an emerging market”. Indeed, by pooling Korea’s technology and India’s scale (coastal land, labour and incentives), both countries can de‑risk their exposure to Chinese‑dominated supply chains, yielding mutual gains.

In the summit’s economic thrust, “chips to ships” was the rallying cry. Alongside shipbuilding, leaders launched a new India-ROK Digital Bridge on AI and data, agreed to expedite the CEPA upgrade, and unveiled multiple business deals. A Korea–India Joint Business Forum (attended by top conglomerates like Samsung, Hyundai, and LG) showcased projects from an AI framework to a POSCO–JSW steel plant in Odisha. Importantly for maritime trade, the two sides agreed to regular industrial‑level interactions, and welcomed announcements by Korean and Indian firms for shipyard development and port infrastructure. They also noted that the Korea Marine Equipment Association (KOMEA) will open its first overseas office in Mumbai, building India’s marine‑equipment ecosystem.

Summit Outcomes: From Talks to Tangibles

The April 2026 State visit yielded scores of agreements far more than at a ceremonial summit. Official communiqués list over twenty cooperation outcomes. Key among them was the “Comprehensive Framework for Partnership in Shipbuilding, Shipping and Maritime Logistics” codenamed VOYAGES (Vision for Operation of Yard Assisted Growth with Efficiency and Scale). This strategic package signed by Prime Minister Modi and President Lee on 20 April was explicitly designed to make India a global shipbuilding hub by 2047 and harness Korean expertise. Under VOYAGES, projects worth an estimated US$13.3 billion are envisioned, including greenfield shipyards (like the flagship 2.5 million GT Thoothukudi yard), port terminals and a joint crane‑manufacturing venture. A landmark tripartite MoU was signed (in the presence of India’s Shipping Minister) between HD KSOE (Hyundai’s shipbuilding arm), the National Shipbuilding Park Authority (Tamil Nadu) and India’s Sagarmala Finance Corporation, to develop India’s first mega greenfield shipyard. Upon completion the Thoothukudi facility alone is expected to handle 2.5 million GT annually and generate almost 15,000 direct jobs.

Beyond shipbuilding, the summit bolstered broader maritime and strategic linkages. Modi and Lee agreed to expand defence cooperation (including a new 2+2 dialogue between defence and foreign ministries), reflecting growing trust. The leaders inaugurated an India-ROK Economic Security Dialogue to focus on critical minerals, green hydrogen and resilient supply chains. On climate and energy, Seoul committed to join the International Solar Alliance (ISA), and India joined Korea’s Global Green Growth Institute. In Modi’s words, “today, Korea is joining the International Solar Alliance and the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative” (IPOI)– a landmark decision signalling Seoul’s support for India-led initiatives. India also invited the ROK into forums like the Global Biofuels and Big Cat Alliances, underscoring wide-ranging cooperation.

Cultural and people‑to‑people ties were not neglected. The summit extended the India‑ROK cultural exchange program through 2030 and marked 2028‑29 as a Year of India‑ROK Friendship. Educational and parliamentary exchanges were expanded, including a planned Korea Education Centre in India and reciprocal ICCR scholarships. These measures build mutual understanding and trust, which the communiqué explicitly linked to underpinning the strategic partnership.

In sum, the Delhi summit was not an endpoint but a catalyst. As one analysis notes, Prime Minister Modi described the visit as transforming a “Trusted Partnership into a Futuristic Partnership”. The flurry of MoUs and joint statements (from shipyards to space cooperation) indicate that “analysis has met opinion”–a research-driven agenda was put into concrete action. But crucially, the summit outcomes are framed as the beginning of implementation, not the conclusion. The leaders committed to meeting annually and held dozens of sectoral dialogues (Industrial Cooperation Committee, Parliamentary links, etc.). In effect, Delhi launched a multi‑year roadmap for cooperation across industries and security domains, signalling the intent to sustain momentum.

Maritime Industrial Statecraft: Sustaining Strategic Momentum through VOYAGES

Among the summit deliverables, the VOYAGES Framework stands out as genuinely novel. VOYAGES, formally titled “Shared Vision for Operation of Yard Assisted Growth with Efficiency and Scale”, is India and Korea’s first multi‑pillar maritime partnership. It goes well beyond past one-off shipbuilding projects to create a comprehensive industrial architecture. Its pillars include large greenfield shipbuilding clusters, brownfield yard upgrades, a vessel‑flagging incentive scheme, port terminal development, maritime skill‑training and heritage cooperation. The framework explicitly aligns with India’s Maritime Amrit Kaal 2047 Vision (MAKV) with ROK’s world-class shipbuilding ecosystem. VOYAGES attempts to marry these asymmetries: Indian coalitions of ports and state governments provide land, financing and a cost-competitive labour pool, while Korean firms bring design know-how, precision fabrication and quality systems. Even the industries’ players sense a paradigm shift: President Lee’s visit was accompanied by almost 150 Korean corporate leaders, and the resulting MOUs (shipyard, cranes, port PPPs) “are, or aspire to be, the load-bearing columns of a new industrial architecture”.

VOYAGES already has concrete outcomes. The Thoothukudi shipyard MoU is “one of the earliest implementation outcomes under the India-ROK maritime cooperation framework”. A separate MOU signed on 20 April establishes a joint crane manufacturing venture between Korea’s Hyundai and India’s BEML. An agreed port development MOU between India’s Ministry of Ports and Korea’s Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries formalises Korean participation in India’s $13.3 billion port investment pipeline. Crucially, these initiatives envision Korean firms not merely as equipment suppliers but as equity partners in shipyards and terminals; a level of integration India has not seen with other partners.

Supply‑Chains and Strategic Hedging

The rise of economic security has transformed shipbuilding from a commercial industry into a strategic industry. States increasingly perceive merchant fleets, repair infrastructure, maritime logistics, and industrial capacity as determinants of national resilience. Consequently, the objective of VOYAGES is not simply to build ships in India, but to establish distributed production networks that reduce systemic vulnerabilities arising from concentrated manufacturing in East Asia.

The maritime partnership also advances broader strategic goals. Both countries have an incentive to reduce dependence on China‑centric supply networks. A 2024 industry review notes the global shipbuilding market is about US$164 billion and heavily Asia‑centric: China holds ~47%, Korea ~25%, and Japan ~18%. By contrast, India’s share is virtually nil (less than 1%). This disparity is a structural opportunity: Indian ports and yards can absorb some excess regional demand, easing bottlenecks in Korea and Japan, while Korea’s technology can boost Indian productivity. Recent joint agreements underline this: beyond VOYAGES, India and Korea launched a Strategic Shipbuilding Alliance in July 2025, under which HD Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering (Hyundai’s shipbuilding arm) signed an MoU with India’s Cochin Shipyard to collaborate across the value chain. Therefore, it VOYAGES can be viewed as a hedge: by deepening maritime ties, both sides enhance supply-chain resilience and reaffirm a free‑and‑open Indo-Pacific aligned with international law.

This economic cooperation is matched by growing defence links. India and Korea have extended reciprocal naval logistics support and have jointly produced and fielded armaments (e.g. the K9 Vajra howitzer). A Korea–India “Defence Accelerator” (KIND‑X) was inaugurated to spur joint R&D, and second-batch production of K9 howitzers is underway. More ambitiously, Korea’s interest in India’s submarine tender (DSME responded to a 2023 Indian RFP for six large AIP subs) and proposed joint JSW–Korea shipbuilding ventures hint at future co‑production in naval shipbuilding. All these deepen maritime trust: in effect, Seoul and New Delhi are “energising the bilateral strategic partnership” through tangible defence cooperation.

Therefore, the significance of the VOYAGES Framework extends beyond its commercial or infrastructural ambitions; it represents the institutional manifestation of what may be conceptualised as maritime industrial statecraft. Unlike traditional maritime cooperation, which has largely centred on naval diplomacy, port calls or episodic defence collaboration, maritime industrial statecraft integrates industrial capabilities into the pursuit of strategic objectives. In this formulation, shipyards, ports, logistics corridors, maritime technology, skilled human capital and resilient supply chains become instruments through which states project influence, enhance strategic autonomy and shape the regional balance of economic power. For both India and the Republic of Korea, maritime infrastructure is no longer merely an economic asset but a strategic resource that underpins national resilience in an era characterised by disrupted supply chains, technological competition and the securitisation of global trade. The convergence of India’s demographic and geographic advantages with Korea’s technological leadership in shipbuilding therefore creates a mutually reinforcing industrial ecosystem capable of reducing vulnerabilities arising from excessive dependence on concentrated production hubs. VOYAGES should thus be understood not as a sector-specific agreement but as a strategic framework that embeds maritime production, industrial cooperation and logistics into the broader architecture of Indo-Pacific statecraft. Unlike maritime diplomacy, which primarily relies on naval engagement and diplomatic signalling, maritime industrial statecraft utilises industrial production, maritime infrastructure, technological cooperation, and logistics networks as instruments through which states pursue geopolitical influence and strategic resilience.

It is precisely for this reason that the momentum generated by VOYAGES cannot be allowed to dissipate after the political symbolism of the Summit. Maritime industrial statecraft derives its strategic value not from the signing of Memoranda of Understanding but from the gradual institutionalisation of production networks, technology transfer, investment mechanisms and regulatory harmonisation. Should implementation falter, the framework risks becoming another declaratory initiative in an increasingly crowded Indo-Pacific policy landscape. Conversely, sustained political commitment would enable India and the Republic of Korea to construct an enduring maritime production network capable of reshaping regional shipbuilding, strengthening supply-chain resilience and providing a credible alternative to existing industrial concentrations in East Asia. More fundamentally, successful implementation would signal a broader transformation in bilateral relations—from cooperation defined by diplomatic engagement to one anchored in long-term industrial interdependence. The continuation of this momentum is therefore not simply desirable but strategically imperative, as VOYAGES provides both countries with a durable mechanism through which maritime capabilities can be translated into geopolitical influence, economic security and long-term regional leadership in the Indo-Pacific.

Maritime Cooperation as an Instrument of Strategy

The durability of India–ROK maritime cooperation cannot be understood solely through the prism of bilateral diplomacy; rather, it reflects the broader strategic recalibration undertaken by both countries in response to an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific. While the Republic of Korea’s Indo-Pacific Strategy (2022) marked a discernible shift from the geographically constrained New Southern Policy (NSP) towards a more expansive regional outlook, Seoul has remained cautious not to frame its regional engagement through overt bloc politics. Instead, it has pursued what Evelyn Goh characterises as strategic hedging, simultaneously expanding partnerships with like-minded middle powers while preserving sufficient strategic flexibility to avoid direct confrontation with China. Within this framework, India occupies a distinctive position. Unlike the United States or Japan, New Delhi offers Seoul a partner capable of advancing regional stability without imposing alliance obligations or compelling strategic alignment against Beijing.

From India’s perspective, engaging the Republic of Korea similarly complements its own doctrine of strategic autonomy. India’s Indo-Pacific strategy has consistently resisted alliance-based security architectures in favour of issue-based coalitions and functional partnerships. Consequently, India’s maritime initiatives including the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) that provide first order specificity to its maritime policy of ‘Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions (MAHASAGAR)’ all have evolved into platforms for coalition-building centred on capacity building and capability enhancement, sustainable maritime governance, disaster resilience, and the blue economy rather than traditional military balancing. The ROK’s decision to formally participate in the IPOI therefore represents more than diplomatic symbolism; it signifies Seoul’s recognition that India’s institutional initiatives provide credible avenues through which middle powers can shape regional governance without becoming subsumed within great-power competition.

Viewed through the lens of complex interdependence, the expanding India–ROK partnership demonstrates that contemporary maritime cooperation is increasingly driven by functional imperatives rather than conventional security calculations. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye argue that interdependence creates multiple channels of interaction that reduce reliance on military instruments alone. The maritime domain exemplifies this transformation. Supply-chain resilience, maritime infrastructure, digital connectivity, clean energy transitions, and maritime technology have become integral components of national security, thereby broadening the scope of bilateral cooperation beyond naval exchanges. Seoul’s accession to the International Solar Alliance and its support for India’s maritime-led initiatives illustrate an appreciation that climate governance, energy security, and maritime resilience are increasingly interconnected policy domains rather than discrete areas of cooperation.

This convergence also reflects the emergence of middle-power institutionalism in the Indo-Pacific. Both India and the Republic of Korea increasingly perceive multilateral institutions not merely as venues for diplomatic engagement but as strategic instruments through which they can shape regional norms despite the growing polarisation of international politics. The conception of a multiplex world order is particularly instructive in this regard. Rather than relying exclusively upon US-led alliance systems or China-centric economic frameworks, middle powers increasingly construct overlapping institutional networks that preserve strategic autonomy while maximising diplomatic influence. Seoul’s participation in Indian-led initiatives such as the IPOI and the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI), alongside India’s engagement with Korean-led industrial and technological initiatives, reflects this broader trend towards institutional diversification.

Importantly, this institutional convergence should not be interpreted as an anti-China coalition. The ROK continues to maintain profound economic interdependence with China, while India similarly avoids formal alliance commitments. Instead, maritime cooperation functions as a mechanism of strategic risk diversification. By expanding collaboration in shipbuilding, maritime logistics, resilient supply chains, and emerging technologies, both countries reduce excessive dependence on any single economic or geopolitical centre of gravity. Maritime cooperation therefore serves as a form of geoeconomic insurance, enabling both countries to enhance resilience without fundamentally disrupting their existing strategic relationships.

This explains why the Summit should be viewed less as a diplomatic breakthrough than as the institutional consolidation of an already evolving strategic logic. The reaffirmation of UNCLOS principles, freedom of navigation, and a rules-based maritime order was not intended merely as declaratory diplomacy; rather, it reinforced a shared normative framework that lowers transaction costs for long-term cooperation across defence, commerce, maritime governance, and industrial development. The expansion of educational exchanges, parliamentary engagement, and maritime capacity-building initiatives similarly contributes to what Karl Deutsch conceptualised as the development of a security community, wherein sustained institutional interactions gradually cultivate strategic trust and policy predictability.

Ultimately, the continued momentum in India–ROK maritime relations derives not from episodic summit diplomacy but from a deeper convergence of geopolitical interests, geoeconomic imperatives, and institutional preferences. As competition in the Indo-Pacific increasingly revolves around supply chains, maritime infrastructure, technological standards, and regional governance rather than solely military power, the maritime domain has become the principal arena through which both countries can simultaneously safeguard strategic autonomy and expand their regional influence. It is this structural convergence rather than the symbolism of summit declarations that explains why India–ROK maritime cooperation is likely to remain both resilient and increasingly institutionalised in the years ahead.

Conclusion: Beyond Episodic Engagement

India–ROK relations have indeed moved beyond the episodic projectism of the past into a more sustained, institutionalised partnership. The Summit and the first Korean Presidential state visit in eight years generated an unprecedented breadth of deliverables, from trade to technology to defence. Yet both capitals understand that such agreements mark a milestone, not a terminus. As the official communiqué notes, previous high‑level meetings have imparted “renewed momentum” to bilateral engagement, and this visit was designed to ensure that momentum continues. Concrete follow‑up actions are already scheduled: joint commissions, 2+2 meetings, business forums, and annual summits are institutionalised to maintain the cadence of cooperation.

The driving logic is clear: India and Korea, as complementary maritime powers, have real stakes in collaborating on shipbuilding, ports, and the oceans. The evidence is compelling – statistics, projects and official statements all corroborate the analysis. The global shipbuilding market is growing and straining Asian capacity. But by working together in frameworks like VOYAGES both India and Korea can capitalise on each other’s strengths and mitigate risks. Crucially, the narrative is being shaped jointly: both governments publicly commit to the same vision of maritime freedom and security, to practical projects at sea, and to people‑to‑people ties ashore.

In sum, the 2026 India‑ROK summit was not an end in itself, but a vigorous bid to sustain the bilateral momentum. Through data‑backed agreements and high‑level political commitment, Delhi and Seoul have signalled that their Special Strategic Partnership will continue “in the years ahead”. If past cooperation was episodic, the current trajectory – with new frameworks, dialogues and joint ventures–promises continuity. With implementation and trust-building now the watchwords, India and the ROK appear poised to turn their maritime commonalities into an enduring “futuristic” partnership in the Indo‑Pacific.