2025년 트럼프 정부와 인도-태평양 전략

Introduction

The 2024 U.S. presidential election brought global attention, probably more than any previous elections not just in the U.S., but in the world. The result, however, came out rather quickly, and it revealed that the U.S. public wants to “make America great again.”

The greatness that Trump and the U.S. public desire is highly U.S.-centered in foundation, and unlike concerns of experts, the U.S. foreign policy could be relatively more predictable, considering Trump’s transparent objectives of “transactional approach” to the world. Trump had continuously appealed that the U.S. is no longer the world police, and it will not provide security or any other benefits unless the right amount of price is paid.

However, some discrepancies lie between Trump’s logic of diplomacy and conventional notion of international cooperation. Allies of the U.S. have been heavily dependent on U.S. and its leadership, hoping for cooperative relationships and mutual development. Trump, on the other hand, deals with diplomacy as business negotiation, and does not hesitate to confront a loss of friendship, even if that is an old ally. Meanwhile, Trump is a strong opponent of China, and had committed his first term to contain and oppress China’s expansion. Trump’s strong anti-China policy could be a benefit to some partners such as Taiwan and the Philippines, as they are going through tough military tensions against the Chinese armed forces.

In addition, Trump’s enigmatic relationships with Kim Jong Un of North Korea and Putin in Russia make security risk calculation more difficult by adding more unexpectable variables into equations. This will be a serious conundrum to Seoul especially, given the strengthened ties between Kim Jong Un and Putin along with the security pact and North Korea’s military deployment to Russia in 2024.

Under such uncertainties, precise anticipation of Trump’s next move as well as multifarious preparedness to his unpredictability are crucially required for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific both individually and collectively. Unlike NATO, a multilateral alliance framework, Asian partners are tied in bilateral or minilateral levels, and the impact of Trump will be much more significant than that in Europe.

Policy Toward China

One of the most predictable moves Trump will take would be the anti-China policy. During his first term, the trade war between the U.S. and China was a major issue affecting the global economy. Under the “America first” stance, the Trump administration had imposed tariffs on almost every imported commodity, and China – the largest factory and labor market of the world – responded with counteractions against the U.S. It is highly likely that such tit-for-tat will be repeated in his second term.

The major difference from Trump’s previous term is China’s economy. China is currently under a severe economic crisis, mostly due to the downturn of real estate sector. The first round of U.S.-China trade war was a close tie with no dominant winner. China’s economy and its influence in global politics then was steadily rising, and the U.S. did not effectively win over China. Afterall, in 2023, President Biden initiated a dialogue with President Xi Jinping to improve relations with China. However, China in 2025 might not be as strong as before, and the second Trump administration could be a bigger threat to China than the first.

Meanwhile, Trump’s decision whether U.S. withdraws from Quad and AUKUS is another variable that could change the U.S.-China relations. Trump’s perspective on alliances and partnerships are quite negative, and he does not wish to further commit to global or regional frameworks. Many experts have already concerned the disruption of Quad and AUKUS in case of Trump’s return, and the member states are raising their attentions toward the White House. The Quad and AUKUS are trans-regional frameworks established to structurally deal with China and Indo-Pacific affairs. The U.S. withdrawal from either Quad or AUKUS, or both in worst case, could be a sign of the downfall of U.S. leadership in the region, and it could turn into an opportunity for Beijing to counter Washington.

Policy Toward Northeast Asia

The Northeast Asian states are situated in probably the most complex position. Three major states – South Korea, Japan and Taiwan – are allies and a close partner of the U.S.; however, all three were perplexed during Trump’s first term. It is a general prospect that Trump will charge high cost to friends and allies of U.S. in return for military defense and security pacts.

Japan is one of U.S.’s closest allies, but it experienced what might have been perceived as a stab in the back. Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is known to be one of the few leaders who successfully maintained a good relationship with Trump. Abe knew that the U.S.-Japan relations under Trump would be different from the past, and he shifted diplomatic approach from government-to-government to individual-to-individual. The two leaders have kept close ties with each other, as Abe constantly provided Trump with gifts and hospitalities.

However, Trump imposed tariffs on Japanese steel in 2018, which was cut in 2022 under the Biden administration. In addition, Japan had to take charge of the establishment of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) in 2018, a free trade agreement pact of eleven countries, as Trump withdrew from its former framework, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), in 2017. Tokyo is bracing for Trump’s return, and Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba seeks to meet with Trump, hoping for a close personal relationship once again like Abe’s.

South Korea is also preparing to secure its expenditures. Trump has continuously claimed that South Korea is not paying enough for its defense and will charge ten billion dollars when elected. And as South Korea’s economy is heavily dependent on exports, Trump’s tariff will affect major industries such as automobile and semiconductor both directly and indirectly.

South Korea is in much more difficult situation, considering South Korea’s position in Russian invasion of Ukraine, North Korea’s deployment to Russia, and Trump’s relationships with Kim Jong Un and Putin. After the failure of the Hanoi Summit in 2019, the Trump-Kim relations began to drift apart, and North Korea has kept its nuclear and missile developments both against South Korea and the U.S. Also, many experts concern that if Trump commits to end the war between Ukraine and Russia, there is a high possibility that he will moderate in favor of Putin, and Pyongyang will also utilize this opportunity as a participant. This could lead to the shift in the balance of power between the two Koreas, giving more leverage to North Korea in terms of the deal with the U.S. on nuclear.

For Taiwan, Trump could raise uncertainties in the Taiwan Strait. Although Xi Jinping has strengthened his tone before and after the Taiwan presidential election in January 2024 by asserting his will for unification, the Biden administration has strived to deal with the Taiwan issue in a manageable level, using both stick and carrot to Beijing. The delicate balance between Washington and Taipei gave Beijing less cause to raise military tensions, as President Lai Ching-te seeks U.S. support while Biden maintains the “one China” principle.

If Trump oppresses Beijing by imposing high tariffs on Chinese exports with no room for negotiation, the backdraft of economic pressure might be projected in a different manner, and Taiwan could be the victim of such retribution. Unlike South Korea or Japan, Taiwan is not an ally of U.S. with mutual defense treaty, and the possibility of Washington protecting Taipei remains opaque. The Biden administration has shown that the U.S. can no longer deal with concurrent global issues through the case of the withdrawal from Afghanistan, Israel-Hamas conflict, and the Russian invasion. There is no certain proof that the U.S. under Trump will be better, and some cast worries that Trump could even exploit such crises to achieve higher defense cost not just from Taiwan, but from other allies and partners as well.

Policy Toward Southeast Asia

The Trump effect in Southeast Asia could be relatively vague compared to that in China and Northeast Asia. The general view is that Trump’s strong policies against China might be an opportunity to Southeast Asia as an alternative manufacturing hub. However, tariffs will be a burden in the long-run, given that they mostly focus on low-cost exports. Moreover, there are concerns that Trump’s indifference to developing states’ domestic issues such as military dictatorship or human rights violence could be a breakthrough for China to expand its influence in the region as a revisionist state.

In terms of the U.S.-China relations, one major beneficiary at a first glance would be the Philippines. The Philippines has been at the forefront standing against China’s nine-dash line claim in the South China Sea, and went through several physical clashes around the Spratley Islands. Manila recently extended its security alliance with Washington, and also Tokyo, to strengthen its defense capability against Beijing’s aggression.

However, whether Trump will uphold the value of alliance and support the Philippines is questionable. The U.S. policy toward China could benefit the Philippines, but it will rather be a fortunate collateral effect rather than an intended outcome. Trump will charge high cost for defense, just as the case with Seoul, and the Chinese aggression over the South China Sea will continue without the U.S.-Philippines coordination.

Besides the Philippines, Trump’s influence will reveal in each state in the region in many different ways: Vietnam is currently struggling to transition its economy from low-cost export model to human capital development and innovation oriented one, but such vision can be frustrated by Trump’s tariffs; the Myanmar junta is still in power thanks to the support from Beijing, and the Chinese influence in other ASEAN states will continue to rise if Trump keeps his disinterest toward the region.

Conclusion

The word “unpredictable” is the most commonly used adjective that describes Trump and his policy, but he also shows transparencies to some extent as he only considers the U.S. and its interests. He sees every movement as a deal, and he gives only after he takes. He is not interested in an indirect or a long-term return, and conventional concepts such as “allies” or “like-minded partners” are merely hollow political rhetorics to him. He showed that he could turn against allies and shake hands with adversaries if he can benefit, and the world will witness such pattern again.

And like it or not, it is a grim reality that the world should face in 2025. The world is now going through the second phase of the Cold War, and the free-market democracies are falling behind China, Russia, North Korea, and even Iran in terms of defense and security. As the U.S. uncertainty grows, it is necessary for allies and partners to prepare for what is about to come, through self-strengthening, further partnerships, and more.

And as much as they increase their roles and responsibilities in global security, so should they be able to deal with U.S. differently, not for a conflict but for a stronger cooperation. There is no guarantee that the next president of the U.S. will not be a Trump-like figure, and it is true that the world today is different from what it used to be, where the U.S. led the global order as the hegemon. It is time for the Indo-Pacific to find other ways for the security of the region, so that they can better cooperate and help each other with or without the presence of the U.S.