대만, 미국과 이웃 파트너들에게 버림받았나?

As incidents multiply between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, at Beijing’s instigation, the United States, under President Donald Trump, appears to be turning away from the American tradition, constantly renewed since 1979, of supporting Taiwan’s autonomy, if not de facto independence. Should this be seen as a repeat of the maximum pressure method employed against Ukraine during negotiations on a potential ceasefire with Russia, or should we fear a complete disengagement by the United States? This second scenario may seem all the more credible given that the United States has recently harshly criticized and threatened to impose prohibitive tariffs and other sanctions against most of its partners and allies, both on the American continent and in Europe and Asia. As far as Beijing is concerned, violations of the median line in the strait and of Taiwan’s air identification zone by balloons, aircrafts and even missiles of the Chinese Armed Forces are increasing, while violations are being observed around the Kinmen Islands, off Xiamen, and the sabotage of submarine cables between the northern tip of the main island and the Matsu Islands archipelago. Furthermore, the circulation of photos and satellite images showing an increase in landing exercises by the Chinese armed forces, which now involve the use of large barges, tends to confirm the intentions of the Chinese authorities to resolve the “Taiwan problem”.

Different Invasion Scenarios

In recent years, several scenarios have been considered to anticipate the different ways Beijing could force Taiwan’s reintegration. The first, based on “wargaming” exercises conducted by the Pentagon, involves a forceful attack on Taiwan. The second, promoted by the American think tank CSIS – China Power, adopts a coercive approach, including the establishment and imposition of a quarantine zone or, more simply, a gradual economic blockade of the island. The third scenario, published by the author, involves a gradual and sequenced invasion of Taiwan-controlled territories, using a blockade technique.

Scenario #1: Heavy Attack on the Main Island

Although the details of the simulation exercises conducted by the Pentagon are unknown, it is expected that an all-out attack from China would include a wave of thousands of missiles, the establishment of a complete air and naval blockade, as well as massive cyber-attacks, sabotage actions and communication warfare campaign. Depending on the different scenario considered, the confrontation could last from several weeks to several months and result in the loss, for China, of nearly 150,000 troops and a large number of surface units of the PLAN, while the US Navy could lose several aircraft carriers and numerous fighter jets, while there is no guarantee that either side would achieve air or naval superiority.

On a practical level, this scenario is the riskiest in several ways, for practical, but also political, economic, and strategic reasons. First, the storm season extends for nearly seven months, reducing the “window of opportunity” for an attack that can only be carried out on a limited number of beaches, given the heavily urbanized coastline. On a military level, the lack of landing craft and barges, as well as marine and/or airborne troops, factors that, combined with the time required to complete a complete rotation between the coast and the island, could only further complicate the task at hand. Politically, China would undoubtedly come under severe and growing pressure coupled with increased isolation, both regionally and internationally.

Economically, establishing naval superiority would require the complete rerouting of all civilian maritime traffic within the strait or even around the entire Taiwan area, which would seriously disrupt maritime transport as well as regional and international port activity, potentially for several months. The same would apply to air traffic, which would have to be rerouted throughout Taiwan and Fujian airspace, and even beyond, if the Chinese Air Force mobilizes airports and airfields in Guangdong, Zhejiang, and Jiangxi (or even those located in the South China Sea).

Bloomberg, in particular, has estimated that a high-intensity open conflict could lead to a loss of 10% of global GDP—17% for China and 40% for Taiwan—and even to a 50% to 80% drop in trade to and from Asia in case the conflict would drag on for months.

Scenario #2: Complete Blockade of Taiwan’s Main Island

In a series of three publications released in 2024, the American think tank CSIS – China Power explored three variations of the same scenario aimed at establishing a blockade around Taiwan in order to assert its authority over the rebellious island by gradually increasing economic and political pressure through various means of coercion: the establishment of a naval and/or air interdiction zone, the implementation of a “quarantine” or “blockade,” both through the permanent, regular, or occasional deployment of dozens of ships (navy, coast guard, maritime militia), the mobilization of the strategic missile force, or the deployment of a naval minefield.

The credibility of this scenario was demonstrated in practice in 2022, during the fourth Taiwan Strait crisis triggered by Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the island. In response to this visit, the Chinese authorities deployed dozens of ships and aircraft, established no-fly zones, and conducted several live-fire exercises, including missile launches in Taiwanese airspace, some of which landed in Japan’s exclusive economic zone. These exercises have since been organized annually, more or less following the same pattern as in 2022.

These exercises are in addition to naval air exercises in the South China Sea and the Bohai Sea, increasingly frequent deployments around the Kinmen Islands, the Diaoyu Islands, and the East China Sea, median line violations, balloon releases, and almost daily violations of Taiwan’s air identification zone.

Scenario #3 :

In an article published in September 2023 in the Korea Institute of Maritime Strategy (KIMS) under the title “Taiwan: An Alternative and Painless Invasion,” the author of these lines presented a third scenario consisting of a gradual takeover of Taiwan-controlled territories, including the Kinmen, Wuqiu, and Matsu Islands, the Pescadores Islands, the islands located in the South China Sea (Itu Aba and Pratas), and then the main island of Taiwan, through a non-lethal and sequenced approach.

The idea here is simple: establishing a complete blockade of all the islands, islets, and reefs closest to the mainland, through the massive mobilization of all available naval assets, from the PLA, the coast guard, and the entire maritime militia (up to 8,000 trawlers), in order to constitute a hermetic barrier and wait, without ever using force, until the water, food, and fuel supplies are exhausted, and then take these same territories “without violence”. Such action would have the advantage of gradually depriving Taiwan of its advanced sensors and forward operating bases, and subsequently facilitating the conduct of a possible forceful action, while increasing the prestige of the Chinese government and armed forces, and correspondingly diminishing that of the opposing authorities and armed forces, and dealing a significant blow to the morale of the population, further facilitating possible undermining efforts by psychological warfare and mass manipulation carried out by Chinese media, local “united front” cells and pro-China influencers.

Thus, initially, the Kinmen, Wuqiu, and Matsu islands would fall, followed by the Pratas and Itu Aba islands, then the Pescadores archipelago, and finally, the main island of Taiwan. In such a scenario, any attempt by the besieged to “exit by force” or to break the blockade by a relief force from the main island could be seen (or presented as such by the Chinese media and authorities) as an aggression against China.

The United States, an unreliable partner?

While Donald Trump has publicly criticized Taiwan for its “dominance” in the electronic chip sector, it’s worth remembering that chip manufacturing represents only one of many dimensions of the value chain, and that in a number of other areas, the United States holds a largely dominant position. Moreover, TSMC’s decision to invest an additional $100 billion in the United States brings its total investment in the country to $165 billion, a sum that is anything but insignificant.

This investment can also be seen as the civilian counterpart to the massive military equipment orders placed by Taiwan since 1979, primarily for the benefit of the United States’ defense industry. This loyalty, however, has been poorly rewarded given the latter’s systematic and systemic delay in fulfilling these orders, with several years of delays. In total, Taiwan has placed orders for a cumulative amount of $93 billion by 2022 (or $182 billion adjusting for inflation), $22 billion of which are still awaiting delivery despite promises made by recent presidents. Among other equipment, deliveries of F-16 fighter jets and missiles have been repeatedly delayed and are now several years behind the initial schedule.

The United States has nevertheless engaged with Taiwan on numerous occasions, including during the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954-1955, 1958, and 1995. Even after the withdrawal of American forces in 1974 and the recognition of Communist China in 1979, the Taiwan Relations Act cemented the relationship for the decades that followed, and this support has been renewed—mediatically, politically, economically, and militarily—in numerous ways. However, it is clear that the pivot policy initiated by Barack Obama, after a long focus on the Middle East, has not led to any notable strategic reinvestment in Taiwan, just, albeit marginally, in the Philippines, while the number of soldiers positioned in Japan, South Korea and Guam has continued to decline, while the fourth crisis in the Taiwan Strait has not given rise to any American reaction following the Chinese demonstration of force.

This feeling of abandonment, though relative, may have been heightened, since Donald Trump’s election as President of the United States, by a series of rather surprising behaviors: criticism of most traditional allies and partners, threats to impose tariffs on Canada, Australia, Mexico, and the European Union, a desire to seize Greenland “one way or another,” playing into Russia’s hands, claiming not to know the meaning of the acronym “AUKUS,” and threatening to exclude Canada from the “Five Eyes” intelligence network. Regarding AUKUS in particular, a program that was nevertheless an emblematic one initiated under the Biden presidency, the Secretary of Defense, after confirming the receipt of a $500 million Australian payment, spoke of the impossibility of implementing it. All of this, certainly, cannot contribute to the peace of mind of Taiwan’s political and military elites.

However, the current situation, as troubling as it may be, should not make us forget that Taiwan is developing its own industrial and technological defense base, with significant successes in the fields of submarines, surface ships, drones and munitions, including hypervelocity missiles.

China, maneuvering to intimidate Taiwan

As we have seen, China is pulling out all the stops to intimidate Taiwan and facilitate its reintegration by any means. However, military action is only considered as a last resort, as Beijing is well aware of the potentially catastrophic damage that a failed invasion would cause.

To achieve its objective without resorting directly to violence, China employs a set of methods that fall into three categories: access denial, hybrid warfare, and gray zone techniques. The first, potentially lethal, aims to establish the capacity to deploy and maintain a bubble or interdiction zone, whether through military means on land, at sea, or in the air. To this end, the Chinese armed forces have significantly strengthened their radar and anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile systems, expanded and improved air bases along the coast, and increased the number and quality of their ships and aircraft. The second includes a set of administrative and legal means, aimed on the one hand at contesting the median line, both at sea and in the air (through the unilateral establishment and modification of flight plans for civil aviation over the strait), and on the other hand at facilitating the conduct of business between the two sides of the strait, while making it easier for Taiwanese citizens to obtain quasi-local identity cards.

The third consists, among other means, of waging an intense information war, deploying ships with increasing frequency, in ever-increasing numbers, ever closer to the coasts of the islands under Taiwan’s control, as well as aircraft, in order to exhaust Taiwanese pilots and crews, contest Taiwan’s maritime and airspace, create a “new normal” to its advantage, and display an increasingly aggressive attitude.

Taipei’s neighbors, unsupportive and undemonstrative

If Taiwan didn’t have enough problems to solve, it’s clear that some countries geographically close to Taiwan do not always act in its best interests. These include the South Pacific countries, which are increasingly turning away from Taiwan each year in exchange for short-term economic aid from China, or certain Southeast Asian countries, including Malaysia and Singapore, which publicly call for the island’s “peaceful reunification” with China, thus adopting the official vocabulary of the Chinese authorities.

All this without counting the individual interventions of certain Asian stars, visible internationally, who openly support Beijing (after having previously supported its adversary), or who refer to Taiwan as “China Taipei,” sometimes after having designated Taiwan as an independent state. All these reversals and changes of position are further evidence of China’s activism. Furthermore, in recent years, there has been a growing involvement of Chinese influencers based on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and even internationally, in favor of Taiwan’s annexation to China. Recently, a Chinese citizen residing in Taiwan named “Yaya” became known after producing and distributing numerous contents openly in favor of the reunification of Taiwan by force and who saw her residence permit not renewed, which did not prevent her from coming to protest against her expulsion on the very day of her departure with a group of supporters in front of an official building in Taipei.

Conclusion

While it cannot be said that Taiwan has been abandoned by the United States, or abandoned by its neighbors, it is clear that it faces significant threats from China and that a lack of support, both in the media and political terms, combined with a cessation of aid and/or arms deliveries, as was the case, even for a short period, with Ukraine, could be perceived by the Chinese political and military authorities as an admission of weakness and a signal that the right time for intervention may have arrived. Although the majority of Taiwanese people support a status quo position and do not identify with China, it is nevertheless clear that most citizens are not prepared to make the necessary sacrifices to defend themselves alone against the threat from Beijing. On the other hand, Taiwan’s armed forces face four major challenges: an aging population, a disaffection for military careers, aging combat platforms, and the country’s extreme dependence on the sea for imports and exports. However, the lessons of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine demonstrate that new equipment and new strategies exist that could enable it to withstand aggression.

Moreover, Taiwan is not alone in the face of Chinese aggression, and several neighboring countries, including Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, also face the same adversary. Japan, in particular, is building new defense installations in the Yonaguni Islands (Ryu Kyu archipelago), including Type-12 missiles whose range will be increased from 200 to 1000 km, while the Philippines has acquired several batteries of Brahmos missiles, which may ensure that a complete encirclement will be more difficult for Beijing to establish than initially imagined, while the United States’ strategy of dispersing its aircraft should prevent any total air superiority.