영국의 2025년 전략방위리뷰: 해양 야망과 전략적 불확실성

The United Kingdom’s Strategic Defense Review (SDR) 2025, which was published in June 2025, marks a significant moment in British defense policy. Defense reviews in the U.K. typically occur every four to five years, aligning with changes in government and strategic outlook. The 2025 SDR follows the 2021 Integrated Review and its 2023 refresh. Both documents responded to emerging geopolitical realities, including the post-Brexit foreign policy recalibration and, critically, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The 2021 Integrated Review and its 2023 refresh reflected a strategic tilt towards the Indo-Pacific, underscoring the U.K.’s intent to deepen partnerships with key regional stakeholders such as South Korea, Japan, and Australia. Notably, in 2023, London and Seoul signed the Downing Street Accords, a comprehensive bilateral agreement encompassing economic and military cooperation. In parallel, the U.K., Japan, and Italy launched a collaborative program in 2022 to develop a sixth-generation fighter jet. Meanwhile, the AUKUS partnership between Australia, the U.K., and the United States was established to advance cooperation on nuclear-powered submarines and cutting-edge defense technologies.

However, the shifting strategic environment, particularly the intensification of state-based threats on the European continent, made another recalibration necessary. The 2025 Review makes it clear: “NATO First” is now the defining principle of U.K. defense policy. Yet crucially, “NATO First” does not equate to “NATO Only”. The United Kingdom remains committed to a global outlook, maintaining its engagement in the Indo-Pacific, but no longer seeks to expand it beyond existing commitments. This renewed Euro-Atlantic focus is driven by a sobering recognition of the U.K.’s vulnerability in an era of hybrid threats and potential high-intensity conflict.

Win for the Royal Navy

Among these broader shifts, the Royal Navy has emerged as one of the principal beneficiaries of the 2025 SDR. In what some analysts have called a “clear win for maritime power”, the SDR sets out ambitious plans to expand and modernize the Royal Navy’s capabilities. By contrast, the British Army, though promised greater lethality through AI and long-range fires, is widely viewed as having received the least tangible uplift. Analysts have pointed out that the Army’s force structure and readiness still lag significantly behind its NATO peers, despite stated ambitions to rebuild its reserve corps and operational capabilities.

The 2025 Strategic Defense Review sets out a transformative vision for the Royal Navy, placing it at the center of the U.K.’s defense posture. Key plans include the construction of up to twelve SSN nuclear-powered attack submarines, an increase from the current fleet of seven, and significant investment in autonomous systems and the modernization of the U.K.’s carrier strike capabilities. While there was speculation that the number of frigates and destroyers might rise from the current 14 to 25, this has proven inaccurate. Instead, the Royal Navy is expected to field a total of 19 escorts by the early 2030s, comprising six destroyers and thirteen frigates.

A major element of the transformation is the modernization of the U.K.’s aircraft carriers. The SDR commits to evolving HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales into platforms capable of deploying hybrid air wings, blending manned F-35Bs with autonomous and uncrewed aerial systems – so-called hybrid air wings – and long-range precision weapons. This will allow the UK to project power globally while enhancing survivability and operational flexibility, especially in contested environments.

Even prior to the 2025 Strategic Defense Review, the Royal Navy had begun implementing initiatives aimed at protecting critical undersea infrastructure and countering Russian submarine threats in the North Atlantic. These efforts included the deployment of fixed sensor networks and uncrewed submarines to enable persistent underwater surveillance. As such, the emphasis on uncrewed and autonomous systems predates the SDR and reflects a broader, ongoing shift in naval strategy toward technological innovation and maritime domain awareness.

In strategic terms, the North Atlantic emerges as a renewed priority. The SDR identifies this region as vital for NATO’s collective defense, particularly in the context of Russian naval resurgence. The Royal Navy will therefore be tasked with defending critical sea lines of communication and deterring hostile Russian activity in this area.

The U.K.’s nuclear deterrent currently relies entirely on its fleet of four SSBNs (nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines), which together maintain a continuous at-sea deterrent (CASD). However, in light of a deteriorating geostrategic environment, the U.K. is now considering the potential acquisition of F-35A fighter jets – complementing its existing F-35B fleet – to enable the delivery of nuclear weapons from the air. While no firm commitment has been made, this early-stage consideration signals a recognition that an exclusively submarine-based nuclear posture may no longer be sufficient to ensure strategic deterrence in an increasingly complex threat landscape.

Clouds over the Plans

Two major challenges could hinder the implementation of the Strategic Defense Review’s ambitious plans: funding and the evolving stance of the United States.

In February 2025, Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced that the U.K. would raise its defense budget from the current 2.3% of GDP to 2.5% by 2027, equating to an increase from approximately $72.3 billion to $80.8 billion. However, analysts have pointed out that achieving the full scope of the SDR, across all domains – not just the maritime elements – would likely require spending of at least 2.7% to 3.0% of GDP. Although the government has stated an ambition to reach 3.0% in the longer term, no firm timeline has been committed, leaving uncertainty over how the proposed plans will be fully funded.

Compounding this issue is growing pressure from the United States, which is urging NATO allies – including the U.K. – to increase core defense spending to 3.5% of GDP, along with an additional 1.5% dedicated to cyber capabilities and defense infrastructure. If NATO adopted this target, the U.K. would face significant fiscal pressure to meet it. However, it remains unlikely that such a substantial increase in defense funding will materialize quickly, even with a formal NATO commitment, raising questions about the feasibility of delivering the SDR’s full vision.

Another concern for London is the shifting and often unpredictable stance of the Trump administration, which raises serious questions about the extent and durability of future alliance with the U.S. The U.K. remains the most deeply integrated European ally within U.S. military and intelligence networks. A clear example of this dependency is the U.K.’s use of U.S.-supplied Trident ballistic missiles aboard its nuclear submarines, missiles that are maintained and serviced by the United States. This arrangement underscores the degree to which Britain’s strategic deterrent, and broader defense posture, could be vulnerable to political shifts in Washington.

The future of the AUKUS partnership, a central pillar of the U.K.’s maritime defense strategy, has recently come under scrutiny, casting uncertainty over one of the Royal Navy’s most ambitious programs. In June 2025, the U.S. Department of Defense launched a formal review of the AUKUS nuclear submarine deal, a move that has caused considerable anxiety in London and Canberra. Led by Elbridge Colby, a senior official known for his skepticism of the pact, the review questions whether continued U.S. support for AUKUS aligns with America’s strategic priorities, particularly amid growing tensions with China.

Any disruption to this arrangement would have significant consequences for the U.K., which has embedded AUKUS into its defense industrial strategy. More broadly, a weakening of AUKUS would signal a retreat from the trilateral vision of deep military and technological integration among key Western allies. For Britain, this raises uncomfortable questions about its enduring alliance and cooperation with the United States. While the British government has reaffirmed its commitment to AUKUS and emphasized the deal’s strategic importance, the Pentagon review has exposed the vulnerabilities inherent in planning future force structure and capability development on an alliance that may be vulnerable to political shifts in Washington. It also reinforces the broader theme that although the U.K. aspires to be a global defense actor, its ambitions depend on continued U.S. commitment to joint projects, an assumption that, as the AUKUS review shows, can no longer be taken for granted.

Conclusion

The 2025 SDR re-anchors U.K. defense in the Euro-Atlantic while granting the Royal Navy unprecedented prominence through AUKUS submarines, carrier modernization, and autonomous systems. Yet the Review’s success hinges on two variables it cannot fully control: adequate, sustained funding above 2.5 per cent of GDP and consistent U.S. commitment, both to NATO and to AUKUS. Should either falter, Britain risks an ambition–resources gap not unlike those that hindered previous defense reviews. In that sense, the SDR is both a bold strategy and a stress test: its implementation will reveal whether the UK can match maritime aspiration with fiscal realism and alliance management.