한-EU 안보방위 파트너십, 해양안보 협력 강화의 문을 열다

South Korea and the EU launched a bilateral Security and Defence Partnership in December 2024. Very meaningfully, the partnership was signed during the final foreign trip of then-EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Joseph Borrell before his retirement from public life. The fact that High Representative Borrell chose Seoul as his last foreign stop before retirement underscores the importance that the EU in particular and Europe in general afford to South Korea as a security partner. The relevance of South Korea as a security partner has only grown in recent weeks, with President Donald Trump’s move to force Ukraine to sign a peace agreement with Russia and his administration’s suggestion that Europe cannot rely on the United States to protect itself against Moscow and other antagonistic countries and groups anymore. In this respect, shared concerns about the behaviour of China, North Korea or Russia are now coupled with a fear of US abandonment as key drivers behind Europe’s need to diversify its foreign security and defence ties.

The Security and Defence Partnership agreed in December of last year is comprehensive in that it includes multiple areas of existing and potential cooperation, from peacekeeping and cybersecurity to nuclear non-proliferation and space defence, among others. At the same time, the partnership is narrow enough to mainly focus on collaboration in areas that both partners agree they want to prioritise. Therefore, the partnership is meant to lay out a blueprint for Seoul and Brussels to move from dialogue to action, focusing on areas in which practical and material cooperation is achievable.

Considering that South Korea and the EU want to focus on actual collaboration, it is significant that maritime security is one of the longest and most detailed sections in the whole partnership document. In particular, Seoul and Brussels have agreed to cooperate in the following areas: exchanges on maritime security based on a rules-based architecture and in accordance with international law, including secure sea lanes and freedom of navigation and overflight; and establishing a regular maritime security dialogue, focusing on operational cooperation, joint exercises and port calls, cooperation in the context of the EU’s Coordinated Maritime Presences (CMP), and maritime capacity building of third countries.

Arguably, operational cooperation should be the cornerstone of maritime security cooperation between the EU and South Korea. After all, this is the most tangible form of cooperation between the two partners in this area and provides material benefits to South Korea, the EU and other partners as well. The December 2024 Security and Defence Partnership identifies successful cooperation between the ROK Navy and the EU’s Operation Atalanta in the Horn of Africa, in the context of the Framework Participation Agreement in EU Crisis Management Operations signed by both parties in 2014, as a successful case of operational cooperation. This is true, and it is certain that cooperation in the Horn of Africa will continue. After all, it is a crucial trade and communication route to connect Asia and Europe marred by piracy and occasionally terrorism. This means that there is a clear incentive for South Korea, the EU and other partners to continue to work together in the region.

At the same time, operational cooperation in the Horn of Africa has been the only case of regular operational cooperation for years. It would make sense to find another region to set up a second instance of regular operational cooperation. Arguably, the Gulf of Guinea could be this second region. The EU already has a CMP in this gulf. And the ROK Navy has sailed its waters. Both South Korea and the EU see the Gulf of Guinea as a region crucial to their commercial interests, as a potential supplementary trade route to the Horn of Africa and as transit point of oil and mineral exports from Western African countries. Furthermore, it is perhaps the only region at the moment in that it is realistic to expect a permanent presence from both the ROK Navy and its European counterparts. Political sensitivities, their own interests and the role of geography in determining security decisions would make it difficult for South Korea and the EU to find another region in which to launch a new instance of permanent operational cooperation. This means that it falls on South Korea to decide whether it wants to have permanent presence in the Gulf of Guinea, which would then open the door to operation cooperation with the EU.

In the case of joint exercises and port calls, in recent years the ROK Navy has already conducted several of joint exercises with European counterparts in the context of multilateral exercises led by the United States. Meanwhile, the ROK Navy has made port calls European countries, while the navies of countries such as France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands or the United Kingdom have also made calls in South Korean ports. This demonstrates that both sides are keen in fostering this type of activities. However, there is a question as to whether South Korea and Europe are ready to conduct joint exercises without the United States, whether by themselves or together with partners such as Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand or Southeast Asian countries. In this respect, it remains to be seen whether the United States will be willing to continue to take a leading role in this area under President Trump. This possibility seems unlikely at the time of writing, but it cannot be completely rejected if the United States pursues a full-blown America First security policy.

Regarding the EU’s CMPs, the Security and Defence Partnership published in December 2024 specifically identifies the North West Indian Ocean as a region in which cooperation can take place. This is a way to refer to wates including those near the South China Sea. CMPs pull together the resources of EU member states willing to deploy their navies to a particular region on a permanent or at least regular basis. South Korea’s and the EU’s willingness to refer to the North West Indian Ocean is thus meaningful in that it signals a readiness to support freedom of navigation in waters that China seems to consider to be its own backyard, including for example by engaging in artificial island building. Both South Korea and the EU may be unwilling to openly confront the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy in the waters in and around the South China Sea. Yet, working together with each other as well as along with partners including Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the United States and Southeast Asia countries would send a strong message to China, while making it more difficult for Beijing to target a particular country in retaliation.

When it comes to maritime capacity building of third countries, the Security and Defence Partnership of December 2024 identifies the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia and the Pacific Region as the key regions to focus on. It is certainly desirable for South Korea and the EU to work together in this area, considering their alignment in the way they understand maritime security. Furthermore, cooperation in the area of capacity building would help to avoid overlap and reduce costs. These are necessary in an era of constrained budgets, in which South Korea and the EU need to decide how their money is spent. This also helps to explain why coordination with like-minded partners such as Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand or the United States would be desirable. This is particularly the case considering that countries across the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia and the Pacific Region want to diversify their ties to avoid dependence on a particular country. Therefore, they are likely to be more receptive to joint initiatives with multiple partners. In this respect, the EU’s CRIMARIO project offers a good template in that this EU-funded capacity-building initiative launched in 2015 has a track record of a clear focus on maritime security, sustainable funding and thus years-long initiatives and a clear emphasis on practical cooperation initiatives.

Certainly, there are constraints to deepening South Korea-EU maritime security ties. To begin with, each of the two partners logically have different geographical priorities. In the case of the EU, in particular, Trump’s second administration and his treatment of Ukraine has led to a greater focus on developing pan-European capabilities outside of NATO to deter future Russian aggressions. South Korea will also need to focus on its own security during the second Trump administration, given the US president’s America First policy. Furthermore, the ROK Navy has traditionally been the least resources of the ROK Army’s three military branches, given South Korea’s traditional focus on the threat posed by North Korea. Similarly to South Korea, the EU and Europe are going to have to increase their focus on land and air resources, since these are the major threats posed by Russia. Therefore, there is going to be less emphasis on naval resources in the near future compared to the army and the air forces. In addition, the EU doesn’t have a navy. This means that the EU depends on member state contributions for its CMPs and other initiatives that necessitate the deployment or resources. It remains unclear the extent to which EU member states may be willing to focus on naval deployments beyond Europe’s vicinity in the near future, considering the constraints mentioned above.

Notwithstanding these constraints, the direction of travel seems clear: South Korea and the EU are boosting their security and defence ties. In this context, maritime security is a key area for cooperation and even coordination between the two sides. The December 2024 Security and Defence Partnership agreed by Seoul and Brussels provides a strong basis for the two partners to take their bilateral maritime security ties to the next level.