유럽과 동아시아 안보에 대한 북한의 군사적 개입의 전략적 의미

Abstract

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has posed a significant challenge not only to the European continent but also to the security environment in East Asia. The direct support provided by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to Russia in its war against Ukraine contributes to the prolongation of the conflict and constitutes one of the most egregious violations of relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. At the same time, this cooperation enables Pyongyang to gain valuable experience in modern warfare, field-test and refine various weapons systems in real combat conditions, and obtain military-technical advantages through its partnership with Moscow.

Relations between Russia and North Korea have evolved beyond transactional engagement, transforming into a strategic and ideological partnership that reflects an effort by authoritarian regimes to reshape the global balance of power under the banner of defending sovereignty and promoting a new multipolar world order.

The absence of effective enforcement mechanisms to counter the unlawful military cooperation between the two countries sets a dangerous precedent for the international security system. It undermines the authority of international law and exposes the inability of key global institutions to adequately respond to sanctions violations. Moreover, it increases the risk of instability spreading to other regions, particularly in East Asia, where Pyongyang’s growing military ambitions may trigger new security challenges for South Korea, the United States, and Japan

The Evolution of Pyongyang’s Support for Moscow

The intensification of Pyongyang’s support for Moscow since the outset of the full-scale invasion has followed a progressive trajectory, developing in direct proportion to the international community’s and key global institutions’ inability to effectively deter Russian aggression and enforce sanctions compliance. As Russia became increasingly isolated on the global stage and military confrontation in Ukraine escalated, the DPRK gradually shifted from declarative backing to active military-technical cooperation. This evolution can be delineated in several stages:

1. Political Endorsement and Support for Aggression (2022)

In July 2022, the DPRK became the third UN member state—alongside Russia and Syria—to officially recognize the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic” and “Luhansk People’s Republic,” Russian-occupied territories in eastern Ukraine since 2014. This move constituted an explicit act of political support for Moscow’s actions aimed at revising Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) systematically aligns with the Russian Federation in United Nations voting processes, particularly in matters related to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

2. Diplomatic Rapprochement and Initial Military Contacts (2022)

The first signs of deepening Russia–North Korea cooperation emerged in August 2022, when Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un exchanged letters calling for enhanced “strategic and tactical cooperation” in response to the “military threat” posed by the United States and its allies. By the fall of that year, U.S. intelligence reported that Russia had procured millions of artillery shells and short-range rockets from Pyongyang for use in its war against Ukraine.

3. Institutionalization of the Alliance: Strategic Alignment (2023–2025)

In 2023, the cooperation began to take on an institutional form. Key developments included the visit of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to Pyongyang in July 2023, during which initial agreements on defense cooperation were reached, and the state visit of DPRK leader Kim Jong Un to Russia in September 2023. During the visit, Kim held talks with Vladimir Putin at the Vostochny Cosmodrome, discussing bilateral collaboration in defense, aerospace, and advanced technologies.

In June 2024, Vladimir Putin made a reciprocal visit to Pyongyang, which culminated in the signing of a Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. The agreement outlines deep military, economic, and political coordination between the two states. Article 4 of the treaty stipulates a mutual assistance clause in the event of external aggression—effectively amounting to a formal military alliance.

4. Provision of Military Assistance (Late 2023–2025)

Starting in the second half of 2023, cooperation between North Korea and Russia took on an unprecedentedly practical dimension. What began as political support evolved into large-scale material and technical assistance, effectively making the DPRK a key supplier of weaponry for Russia’s war against Ukraine.

According to the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) report titled “Unlawful Military Cooperation including Arms Transfers between North Korea and Russia,” released on 29 May 2025, since September 2023, North Korea has transferred over 20,000 containers of ammunition and military equipment to Russia. This included at least 9 million units of artillery shells and rockets. These comprised 82mm, 122mm, 130mm, 152mm, and 170mm rounds compatible with Russian artillery systems such as the D-20, D-30, M-30, M-46, and D-74, as well as 122mm rockets used in multiple rocket launchers.

In 2024, the DPRK also delivered at least 100 KN-23/24 ballistic missiles, which were used by Russia to target civilian infrastructure in Ukraine.

Additionally, Pyongyang transferred elements of three brigade sets of heavy artillery, which included 170mm long-range self-propelled guns, 240mm multiple rocket launch systems, and over 200 pieces of military equipment—including self-propelled artillery units, MLRS platforms, and associated reload vehicles. North Korea also supplied Bulsae-4 anti-tank guided missiles and RPG-type anti-tank grenades.

5. Deployment of DPRK Military Personnel and Formal Recognition of Involvement in the War (2024–Present)

In the second half of 2024, military cooperation between Russia and North Korea escalated to a new phase involving not only arms transfers but also the direct participation of North Korean military personnel in combat operations against Ukraine on Russia’s side.

On 14 October 2024, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy publicly declared North Korea’s de facto entry into the war on Russia’s side, citing intelligence about the deaths of six North Korean engineering officers following a Ukrainian strike near Donetsk. Since October 2024, the DPRK has deployed over 11,000 troops to Russian territory, including to the Kursk region, where they participated in combat operations against Ukrainian forces. Between January and March 2025, North Korea transferred more than 3,000 additional soldiers to the theater.

In April 2025, both governments officially confirmed the presence and involvement of North Korean military forces in the conflict.

Moscow opens the way for Pyongyang to military technologies and combat experience

Despite numerous pieces of evidence, including intelligence reports, satellite images of logistical routes, and the discovery of North Korean ammunition and missiles on Ukrainian territory, the Russian Federation and North Korea have for a long time consistently denied the facts of military-technical cooperation, dismissing related accusations as part of a Western disinformation campaign. However, after the official recognition of North Korean troops’ involvement in the war, both sides began to refer to Article 4 of the Treaty on Strategic Partnership. Kim Jong Un described this as an exercise of sovereign rights to protect a “brotherly nation.”

Russia and North Korea attempt to equate their military actions against Ukraine with the international support Kyiv receives from its allies. Yet there is a significant difference in legal definitions: Ukraine is defending itself from armed aggression under Article 51 of the UN Charter, which guarantees the right to collective and individual self-defense, and the fact of Russia’s aggression is documented by the UN General Assembly resolution “Aggression against Ukraine” dated March 2, 2022, along with numerous other international documents. Meanwhile, the involvement of North Korean soldiers with the knowledge and support of their government constitutes a violation of international law. Nevertheless, holding Russia accountable for military aggression against Ukraine, as well as legally assessing the actions of the North Korean government, requires prolonged diplomatic efforts and may take considerable time.

Meanwhile, the partnership with Russia provides North Korea with critically important economic and financial benefits and mitigates the impact of Western sanctions and isolation. Russia itself is actively dismantling the international sanctions architecture against North Korea: blocking the introduction of new restrictive measures in response to missile tests, obstructing the extension of the UN Expert Group’s mandate, and systematically violating UN Security Council resolutions that it had previously supported. Moscow’s need for military support from North Korea has transformed the DPRK from formal sanctions target into an active beneficiary of the war.

According to the Open Source Centre and BBC, in 2024 North Korean tankers made 43 voyages to an oil terminal in Russia’s Far East, delivering over 1 million barrels of oil, while reports to the UN Security Council’s Committee 1718 indicate only about 300,000 barrels, suggesting covert supplies from Russia, systematic sanctions violations, and actual exceeding of established limits. Ukrainian intelligence reports that despite UN resolutions, at least 13,800 North Koreans were involved in construction, agriculture, and defense industry enterprises in Russia in 2024. This is not only a source of foreign currency revenue for the DPRK regime but also a way to expand support for the rear of Russia’s war machine.

In response to military support, Russia has transferred modern weaponry and military technologies to North Korea. According to the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team, since November 2024 the DPRK has received from Russia short-range air defense systems, electronic warfare systems, including signal jamming equipment, and at least one combat vehicle of the “Pantsir” type. Additionally, North Korea is testing and improving its own weapons under real conditions. A notable example is the enhancement of DPRK ballistic missiles. Representatives of Ukrainian intelligence confirm that the first batches of KN-23 (Hwasong-11) missiles transferred by North Korea to Russia had low accuracy and technical failures—the trajectory dispersion ranged from 500 to 1500 meters, and some warheads detonated in the air. However, due to technical support from Russia, Pyongyang was able to promptly improve navigation and stabilization systems, increasing missile accuracy and combat effectiveness.

In a recent interview with The War Zone, the head of Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence, Kyrylo Budanov, stated that Russia and North Korea have an agreement to establish production facilities on DPRK territory for UAVs such as the “Harpy” and “Geran” (the Russian version of the Shahed-136). Shahed-type drones have become one of the most potent aerial threats to Ukraine. Initially, these UAVs were supplied to Russia by Iran, but now Russia has set up its own production, constantly improving the capabilities and attack schemes across Ukraine’s entire territory. The presence of such UAVs will, on one hand, ensure a steady export channel of assault drones primarily to Russia, and on the other hand, help satisfy North Korea’s own needs.

In addition to technological gains, North Korea acquires unique experience in conducting modern warfare: North Korean soldiers are trained by Russian military personnel in artillery, UAV usage, infantry operations, and trench clearing, which they then apply on the battlefield. The presence of senior military officers, generals, and other high-level military leadership on the front line—including the Deputy Chief of the DPRK General Staff—helps systematize soldiers’ combat skills, study modern conflict tactics, and integrate acquired knowledge into the military planning and training of the DPRK Armed Forces.

The North Korean Factor: Limits of Global Deterrence Effectiveness in Russia’s War Against Ukraine

The deepening military cooperation between Russia and North Korea has evolved into a systemic and coordinated partnership. Pyongyang ensures a steady supply of weaponry, expanding its range, as well as manpower resources, enabling Moscow to sustain its war of attrition against Ukraine. According to Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR), North Korea represents the most significant challenge among Russia’s allies, as the volume of military materiel directly affects the intensity of hostilities and substantially exceeds the capabilities of Ukraine’s Western partners, particularly in terms of ammunition supply.

Russia’s reliance on North Korean military support is, on one hand, a consequence of the failure of the international security system to establish effective deterrence mechanisms and hold violators of international law accountable. On the other hand, this dynamic is exacerbated by the vulnerability of Ukraine’s Western allies to Russian coercion and their reluctance to enforce clear “red lines” regarding Russia’s actions. This has critically undermined their ability to anticipate threats and provide the level of assistance necessary to halt Russian aggression.

The growth in North Korean military support has been cumulative and calibrated in response to the reactions of Western states and potential repercussions for both Russia and North Korea. The absence of a comprehensive policy—encompassing not only diplomatic condemnation but also systematic blockade of logistical chains and effective countermeasures against military-technical cooperation between North Korea and the Russian Federation—reflects the limited political will of leading global powers. In particular, the failure to implement maritime interdiction measures against shipments of ammunition and weaponry between Russia and North Korea demonstrates the international community’s incapacity to enforce an effective strategy to curb lethal arms transfers.

Equally concerning is the uncontrolled flow of dual-use components to North Korea, which facilitates the scaling up of its missile production capabilities and subsequent resupply of Russian armed forces. As highlighted in a report by Ukraine’s Independent Anti-Corruption Commission (NAKO), fragments of KN-23/24 missiles used by Russia in attacks on Ukrainian territory contained components manufactured by enterprises in the United States, Europe, and Asian countries. Some components date from 2023, indicating the existence of active and rapidly operating supply chains. Earlier, the British research organization Conflict Armament Research (CAR) reported that 75% of components in one of the first North Korean missiles used against Ukraine originated from US companies.

The principal challenges in monitoring and curbing the supply of dual-use goods to North Korea lie in the complex network of intermediaries—particularly Chinese companies purchasing sanctioned goods through opaque supply chains—the widespread prevalence of counterfeit products, and insufficient oversight by manufacturers and distributors in Western countries, who often avoid stringent controls due to financial interests. This situation exacerbates the systemic crisis in sanctions monitoring and underscores the urgent need to develop integrated multilateral response tools, including enhanced technical intelligence, supply chain control, and automated tracking of dual-use goods.

Conclusion

A critical issue for Ukraine lies not only in confronting both Russia and the DPRK simultaneously, but also in the persistent underestimation of the threat posed by the emerging Russia–North Korea alliance among Western partners and allies. The implications of this partnership extend far beyond Ukraine’s borders and will increasingly raise the cost of security not only for Europe but also for East Asia and the broader international system. A potential cessation of the Russo-Ukrainian war will not necessarily mark the end of this alliance, as both actors pursue a strategic objective of undermining the current international order and establishing a more favorable geopolitical architecture.

The accumulated military capabilities and operational experience of Pyongyang may significantly increase security risks on the Korean Peninsula, while Russia—according to European intelligence assessments—could initiate military aggression against one or more neighboring NATO countries in the coming years. In both scenarios, there is credible reason to anticipate reciprocal support between the two regimes, tested through their cooperation in the war against Ukraine. This dynamic underscore the interconnectedness of global security and the necessity of a coordinated response among democratic states to counter the consolidation of the Russia–North Korea alliance.

To effectively contain this military partnership, enhanced coordination of intelligence efforts and sanctions enforcement is essential, requiring joint action by the United States, European, and Asian partners. It is critical to strengthen oversight of supply chains for sensitive technologies—particularly those transiting through third countries—by employing advanced analytical tools capable of detecting and disrupting illicit networks. Simultaneously, the threat posed by the Russia–North Korea alliance must be integrated into global security strategies, supported by the development of multilateral platforms capable of ensuring long-term resilience in the international security order.