변화하는 미국의 모습: 주방위군 배치와 마약 밀수선 공격

In an era when major powers openly disregard international rules—from Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine to China’s dismissal of the South China Sea arbitration ruling as “worthless scrap paper”—the United States has recently shifted toward more forceful tactics that test existing legal frameworks. This shift includes the imposition of tariff measures that diverge from established international trade rules.

One particular concern is the deployment of National Guard troops—reportedly without the consent of state governors or local mayors—to support crackdowns on illegal immigration, a move that has also complicated efforts to address unauthorized employment. An extension of this approach reportedly led to an incident on September 4, 2025, in which approximately 300 Korean factory workers in Georgia were detained by U.S. immigration authorities. The incident has cast a shadow over U.S.–South Korea relations.

Additionally, U.S. forces have attacked suspected drug-smuggling vessels on the high seas in the Caribbean, killing crew members and signaling a willingness to use force in maritime interdiction efforts. On January 3, 2026, U.S. authorities also detained the Venezuelan president and his wife. These actions may implicate both international law and U.S. domestic law.

This article examines the legal issues surrounding the deployment of the National Guard and attacks on drug-smuggling vessels, and considers potential international responses.

1. National Guard Deployments Forced Through Despite Legal Battles

This section addresses the controversy surrounding National Guard deployments. In response to protests against the mass roundup of undocumented immigrants in Los Angeles, President Trump deployed National Guard forces on June 8, 2025. Subsequent deployments were reportedly made to Washington D.C. on August 11, and to Memphis, Tennessee, on September 15, with the administration describing them as security measures. California’s governor filed suit in federal district court, arguing that deployments undertaken without a gubernatorial request infringed on the governor’s authority. On September 2, the court ruled the deployments illegal. Washington D.C. has also filed a similar lawsuit.

The National Guard is maintained by each U.S. state and operates under a dual state–federal structure. In peacetime, it is under the command of the governor and performs functions similar to a homeland defense force, including maintaining public order (for example, suppressing riots) and providing disaster relief. In wartime—or when otherwise federalized—it serves under presidential and federal command as a reserve component of the federal armed forces.

The legal controversy often turns on the Guard’s status and mission. When National Guard troops are incorporated into the federal military and operate, they are considered military forces and are subject to the Force Comitatus Act (PCA), which limits the use of military forces to maintain domestic security. By contrast, when Guard forces remain under state command, they may perform law-enforcement-related functions consistent with state law, and the PCA does not apply in the same way. The Coast Guard is treated differently because it has an express statutory law-enforcement mission.

The distinction matters because the PCA’s basic purpose is to prevent the military from serving as a domestic police force unless expressly authorized. If the deployments described above were undertaken as federal missions without the relevant legal predicates, they raise questions about whether Guard forces were used in ways that domestic law does not permit.

Historical practice illustrates why requests and legal authorities are closely scrutinized. During the 1992 Los Angeles riots, the governor requested federal assistance, and Guard forces were deployed to restore order. In the present controversy, critics argue that comparable state requests were not made and that the deployments were instead driven by federal enforcement objectives, which would heighten PCA-related concerns.

Following the district court ruling in California, the administration appealed, and subsequent stays and conflicting rulings in other jurisdictions have reportedly prolonged uncertainty. For example, litigation over deployments to Portland, Oregon, has produced a mix of injunctions and appellate decisions that allow deployments to proceed, reinforcing the sense that the legal landscape remains unsettled.

President Trump has also stated an intent to deploy National Guard troops to high-crime cities such as Chicago and New York to “protect Americans from crime,” suggesting that similar disputes could recur. While this is fundamentally a domestic U.S. issue, it has external consequences, as illustrated by the temporary detention of foreign workers who are not readily classifiable as unauthorized migrants. Moreover, if policymakers view cross-border narcotics flows as intertwined with immigration enforcement, domestic deployment debates can become linked—politically and operationally—to maritime counternarcotics actions abroad.

2. Attacks on Drug-Smuggling Vessels with an Unclear Legal Basis

This section addresses reported U.S. attacks on suspected drug-smuggling vessels. According to the article’s account, U.S. forces conducted multiple attacks in September and October 2025 against vessels suspected of drug smuggling in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific, resulting in fatalities, and reports as of January 2026 suggested a larger campaign with significant casualties. These reports have prompted questions about the legal basis for using lethal military force in what is ordinarily treated as a law-enforcement mission.

International law provides relevant constraints. UNCLOS obligates states to cooperate in suppressing illicit drug trafficking on the high seas, but it also reflects the general principle of flag-state jurisdiction. As a rule, ships on the high seas fall under the jurisdiction of the state whose flag they fly. UNCLOS itself does not provide an authority to board foreign-flag vessels on suspicion of drug trafficking in the same way it does for narrow categories such as piracy, meaning interdictions often require flag-state consent or another specific legal basis.

The 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances is widely treated as a key instrument for operational cooperation against maritime drug trafficking, but it does not erase the flag-state principle; it is implemented through consent-based procedures and specific agreements. Where coercive measures (boarding, searching, seizure) are carried out without the required consent or legal authority, the risk of treaty violation increases.

Domestic law raises parallel issues. In the United States, drug smuggling is a criminal matter, and maritime drug interdiction is normally associated with the Coast Guard’s law-enforcement role. By design, the PCA limits the federal military’s direct involvement in domestic law enforcement absent express authorization, maintaining the principle that military force should not substitute for policing.

Supporters of the reported operations may argue that the United States is engaged in an armed conflict with drug cartels and that the attacks therefore fall under the law of armed conflict rather than peacetime law enforcement. However, framing the matter as “armed conflict” raises additional questions, including whether the requirements of necessity and proportionality are satisfied and whether the methods used comply with rules governing distinction and perfidy, particularly if aircraft are alleged to have been disguised as civilian planes.

Even if drug smuggling is a grave threat, it does not automatically justify bypassing the legal constraints that govern the use of force at sea. For that reason, clearer public explanations of legal authorities, operational safeguards, and oversight would be essential to sustain the legitimacy of any such campaign.

3. New International Initiatives

In his address to the UN General Assembly on September 23, President Trump emphasized what he characterized as United Nations dysfunction. Against a backdrop in which states that flout international rules occupy two-fifths of the permanent UN Security Council seats, his critique may resonate even with those who question U.S. conduct.

If the United States normalizes lethal interdiction operations on the high seas without clear legal authority, the precedent could erode the international community’s legal order. For that reason, the issue warrants a response that strengthens lawful cooperation rather than accelerates norm-breaking. What countermeasures can be considered?

Existing models offer starting points. Maritime interdiction operations and multinational counter-piracy deployments have shown that coordinated surveillance, boarding procedures, and shared rules of engagement can disrupt illicit networks while preserving legal legitimacy. Building on such experience, one option would be to pursue a UN mandate (or other multilateral legal framework) tailored to maritime counternarcotics operations in key trafficking corridors in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific. Participating states could establish a joint information center, integrate maritime domain awareness, and develop agreed procedures for consent-based boarding, detention, and prosecution.

South Korea could contribute meaningfully to such efforts. As a maritime power and a country with a stake in the integrity of international law, South Korea can demonstrate commitment to the rule of law even in regions beyond its immediate security perimeter. Transnational drug networks are not confined to one ocean basin, and a credible global response will ultimately require interoperable surveillance and enforcement frameworks.

Of course, existing institutions also have limits. Bodies such as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and regional organizations such as CARICOM support cooperation, but they are not designed to replace operational interdiction capacity at sea. Where some states lack capability—or where corruption and criminal networks compromise enforcement—multinational naval cooperation may be one of the few effective tools available.

Such cooperation can also align with U.S. interests. Reducing narcotics flows supports domestic public safety goals and may therefore be politically sustainable. If South Korea and Japan were to participate, their cooperation could also build trust with the United States and, in turn, strengthen their alliances.

The international community has entered a difficult phase in which it must resist the “rule by force,” restore the “rule of law,” and balance both approaches to find workable solutions. Even if the initiative proposed here is not a complete answer, it could at least help lay the groundwork for one.