천하삼분지계(天下三分之計): 트럼프의 신 삼국지

Abstract

Since the beginning of the second Trump administration, the international system has experienced a rapid shift in power dynamics. Beginning with tariff renegotiations in 2025, Washington has applied sustained pressure on its allies in both Europe and East Asia to reshape the global order. At the same time, President Trump’s rhetoric toward China and Russia – long regarded as the United States’ principal strategic competitors – has appeared comparatively restrained, despite ongoing crises in Taiwan and Ukraine. Many analysts argue that Trump prefers to engage primarily with major powers while discounting the interests of smaller allies and partners. If so, this worldview bears resemblance to the strategic logic articulated by Zhuge Liang (諸葛亮) to Liu Bei (劉備) during ancient China’s Three Kingdoms period. This article examines recent shifts in U.S. foreign policy, assesses how these changes may influence America’s competitors, and considers the potential contours of the emerging international order through comparison with the Three Kingdoms era.

Introduction

On December 5, 2025, the White House released the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS). In essence, the document proclaimed the end of Pax Americana, under which the U.S. upheld the global order as the leader of the free world. It called for “fair” and “reciprocal” relationships with allies through adjustments to trade arrangements and defense cost-sharing, while signaling a strategic reorientation away from global commitments and toward the Western Hemisphere. Although the NSS explicitly identified China as a major competitor – mentioning it nineteen times – the document primarily conveyed President Trump’s intention to reduce U.S. responsibilities abroad while preserving America’s status as a global superpower.

More striking, however, was the NSS’s treatment of China and Russia. Despite ongoing tensions over Taiwan, China was framed more as an “economic rival” than as a comprehensive strategic adversary. The document emphasized trade and economic competition while placing greater security burdens on U.S. allies, particularly South Korea and Japan. Russia, meanwhile, was no longer characterized as a primary threat to the international order, notwithstanding its continued war in Ukraine. In contrast to the language used by European governments, the NSS underscored the need for “diplomatic engagement” with Moscow to establish “strategic stability.” Overall, the 2025 NSS may be interpreted as comparatively accommodating toward U.S. adversaries while adopting a more demanding posture toward allies.

This apparent devaluation of alliances, combined with a more pragmatic tone toward adversaries, has led many observers to conclude that Trump prefers to deal primarily with major powers rather than smaller partners. Under this interpretation, the president’s worldview divides the international system into three major regions: the Western Hemisphere, Europe, and Asia. Analysts in allied countries have expressed concern that such a perspective could imply tacit acceptance of Russian and Chinese actions within their respective spheres of influence, so long as U.S. core interests are not directly threatened. Historically, this logic bears resemblance to Zhuge Liang’s advice to Liu Bei during the Three Kingdoms period of ancient China: first accept a tripartite division of power, and only later seek strategic advantage within that structure.

Trump’s Signals and Strategic Reorientation

The 2025 NSS did not mark the beginning of this transformation in U.S. foreign policy. Even before returning to the White House, Trump repeatedly outlined his vision of “Make America Great Again” during the campaign. Whether or not articulated formally in the NSS, his foreign policy approach has been more confrontational toward partners and institutions than that of previous administrations. The NSS thus functions less as a blueprint than as a confirmation of an already evident strategic direction. What troubles U.S. allies and many analysts is the possibility that this abrupt shift may send ambiguous or destabilizing signals to Beijing and Moscow, thereby heightening uncertainties in both Europe and Asia.

One such signal was the administration’s use of tariffs. Shortly after his return, Trump insisted that U.S. trade relationships required fundamental recalibration. Although framed as an effort to achieve “fair” and “reciprocal” arrangements, tariffs were frequently employed as coercive instruments when counterparts resisted U.S. demands. The White House identified fifteen countries as the so-called “dirty 15,” and fourteen of which – excluding China – were U.S. allies or partners. This approach suggested that alliance commitments and institutional arrangements could be subordinated to narrowly defined national interests. Experts view this policy as a denial of economic institutionalism and a challenge to the rules-based order.

The second signal concerned alliance cohesion. Trump repeatedly criticized U.S. allies for insufficient defense spending, portraying European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as free riders and describing South Korea as a “money machine.” Tensions between Washington and Europe undermined NATO unity at a time when they had to deal with Russia, and Trump’s statements on Greenland only worsened the situation. In East Asia, both South Korea and Japan demonstrated willingness to increase their defense spending and investments in the U.S. However, Washington’s promotion of “strategic flexibility” raised questions about potential changes to the roles of U.S. Forces Korea and U.S. Forces Japan, which could impose heavier security burdens on both countries.

Lastly, Trump demonstrated a willingness to employ military force to achieve political objectives. On June 22, 2025, amid escalating tensions between Israel and Iran, U.S. forces conducted strikes against three Iranian nuclear facilities under “Operation Midnight Hammer.” And on January 3, 2026, the U.S. launched “Operation Absolute Resolve” against Venezuela, capturing President Nicolás Maduro and his wife on narcoterrorism charges. Regardless of debates over legality or proportionality, these operations conveyed a clear message: the U.S. can – and will – use force decisively when necessary. Although the two operations targeted adversaries, they also unsettled allies, particularly in Europe, given Trump’s assertion that he would act on Greenland “whether they like it or not.”

Despite proclaiming the end of Pax Americana, Washington has shown little inclination to relinquish its hegemonic status. Rather, Trump appears to envision a revised U.S.-led order with reduced obligations and a narrower definition of responsibility, reflecting the belief that previous administrations overextended U.S. commitments.

Reactions of the Anti‑West Alignment in the Indo‑Pacific

China’s commemoration of the 80th anniversary of Victory over Japan on September 3, 2025, symbolically marked the consolidation of what some observers describe as an emerging “anti‑West alignment” in the Indo‑Pacific. The image of Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong Un standing together during the parade signaled their shared interest in resisting U.S. influence. Yet many analysts viewed that these relationships are driven more by overlapping grievances and strategic necessity than by deep trust or shared values. As Washington’s attention increasingly shifts toward the Western Hemisphere, Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang may each seek to exploit the resulting strategic space in pursuit of their own objectives.

China

China’s official reaction to the NSS was critical but restrained. Although the document identified China as the primary economic competitor of U.S., analysts at the Center for Naval Analyses observed that Beijing’s response was carefully measured and largely formulaic, reiterating established positions on global governance, international trade, and Taiwan.

Nonetheless, the NSS may have conveyed ambiguous signals to Chinese policymakers. Chapter IV of the document emphasizes the enforcement of a so‑called “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, aimed at restoring American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere through active intervention. Critics have interpreted this stance as a form of power‑centric retrenchment that deprioritizes liberal norms, multilateralism, and democratic values. From this perspective, the doctrine suggests a selective application of hegemony rather than a wholesale retreat from global leadership.

Such an approach could encourage Beijing to be more assertive in East Asia. China may seek to reinforce its claims in the South China Sea along the Ten‑Dash Line, or beyond the First Island Chain, arguing that these actions serve national security and regional stability. Gray‑zone activities could also become more explicit, testing the limits of U.S. tolerance.

At the same time, China has increasingly sought to position itself as an alternative leader in global governance. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit held in Tianjin from August 31 to September 1, 2025, exemplified this ambition. Attended by leaders from twenty‑four countries, the summit produced the Tianjin Declaration, which called for multilateralism, security and economic cooperation, and a multipolar international order, while criticizing Western dominance. Terms such as “institutionalization” and “global governance” – once closely associated with liberal democracies – were repurposed to advance Beijing’s strategic interests. As Washington emphasizes “America First,” China appears increasingly willing to present itself as a champion of an alternative international order.

Russia

Moscow announced a relatively positive response to the NSS, as it did not characterize Russia as an existential threat. Instead, Washington framed Russia as a potential counterpart for negotiation, emphasizing the need for strategic stability and an expeditious end to hostilities in Ukraine, while encouraging Europe to assume greater responsibility for its own defense. This language may have reinforced Kremlin perceptions of declining U.S. intention to engage with Russian actions directly.

Russia may have also drawn lessons from the U.S. operation in Venezuela. The rapid and decisive nature of the campaign underscored Washington’s readiness to act unilaterally. In a CNN interview, White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller stated that the world is governed by “strength, force, and power,” emphasizing that the U.S. would “conduct itself as a superpower.” For Moscow, such rhetoric may have provided a discursive basis for justifying the great power assertiveness, even if it did not confer legitimacy.

Given Trump’s past comments to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and ongoing tensions between the U.S. and Europe, particularly over Greenland, Russia may calculate that NATO cohesion will continue to weaken. In such environment, Moscow could feel emboldened to sustain or expand its military operations in Ukraine.

North Korea

One notable feature of the 2025 NSS is the omission of North Korea. Unlike the 2017 and 2022 strategies, the document makes no reference to the Korean Peninsula, denuclearization, or the North Korean regime. Given that North Korea appeared seventeen times in the 2017 NSS, this absence signals a marked decline in Washington’s stated attention to the issue.

Following the U.S. operation in Venezuela, Pyongyang issued a statement condemning U.S.’ “rogue behavior,” though its tone was relatively restrained. And on the same day, North Korea conducted a ballistic missile launch into the East Sea. While likely preplanned, the launch was used as an opportunity for the regime to draw attention in the midst of what it described as an increasingly volatile international environment.

For Seoul, Washington’s apparent indifference raises serious concerns. Some analysts argue that the omission of North Korea reflects a deliberate effort to preserve diplomatic flexibility, while others fear that it implicitly acknowledges North Korea as a de facto nuclear power. Regardless of intent, Pyongyang may seek to exploit this ambiguity by advancing its nuclear and missile capabilities to strengthen its bargaining position.

A New Three Kingdoms Order?

Taken together, the NSS and Trump’s broader foreign policy suggest a worldview that divides the globe into three principal regions: the Western Hemisphere, Europe, and the Indo‑Pacific. This division aligns with the presence of three major powers – the U.S., Russia, and China – while relegating allies and partners to a secondary role. In this vision, power supersedes international norms, and alliances are valued primarily for their utility.

This perspective bears resemblance to Zhuge Liang’s strategic advice to Liu Bei during the Three Kingdoms period of ancient China. Zhuge advocated first securing a stable tripartite balance before pursuing eventual unification. While historical analogies have clear limitations, the comparison offers a useful heuristic for understanding Trump’s apparent acceptance of a divided order as a means of preserving relative advantage.

As the U.S. focuses on consolidating influence in the Western Hemisphere, Russia and China may likewise seek to expand their own strategic spaces. Although U.S. alliances in Europe and Asia are unlikely to collapse in the near term, the definition of alliance may change under new order. If Trump’s worldview aligns with that of Zhuge Liang, conventional U.S. allies might fear that mutual defense commitments and shared principles could be neglected in favor of narrowly defined U.S. interests and superpower politics.

Conclusion

The transformation of U.S. foreign policy under Trump’s second administration has been more pronounced than during his first term. From trade disputes to military actions, Trump has shown his preference for decisive action over restrained rhetoric to the world. As a result, the uncertainties surrounding U.S. intentions toward both rivals and allies is likely to continue.

The U.S. today differs markedly from that in the past, but it is the reality that allies and partners must confront. Trump’s return underscores that “Trumpism” is no longer an anomaly in American politics. Like it or not, U.S. partners will need to adapt to this evolving strategic environment and find ways to safeguard their interests within an increasingly power‑centric international order.