경제적 영향력을 통한 해군력 증강: 중국의 지부티 진출과 한국에 대한 시사점

Abstract

China’s overseas military presence is expanding in conjunction with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Djibouti, China’s first overseas military base, provides a strategically critical foothold at the entrance to the Red Sea, enabling sustained naval operations into the Indian Ocean and beyond. This article examines how economic pressures, debt exposure, and infrastructure dependence contributed to Djibouti’s decision to host the People’s Liberation Army Support Base (PLASB), and how that base enhances the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) blue-water capability. It argues that this development is not an isolated case but a model that could shape future Chinese access agreements across the Indo-Pacific and wider maritime domain. The article concludes with implications for South Korean maritime security strategy and why the issue requires urgent prioritisation in Seoul’s policy landscape.

Introduction: Why Djibouti Matters for Korea and the Indo-Pacific

China’s maritime rise is transforming global sea-power balances, particularly in chokepoint regions essential to international trade. More than 90% of South Korea’s energy supply transits maritime routes vulnerable to foreign interference. This includes the Bab el-Mandeb, a narrow maritime corridor linking the Indian Ocean to Europe through the Red Sea. Chinese access to this chokepoint through its Djibouti base holds significant implications for freedom of navigation and the security of trade routes vital to Korea’s economic resilience.

Beijing’s approach blends economic engagement, infrastructure investment, and military positioning — a strategy often described as “hybrid power projection”. Djibouti now serves as a blueprint for how China can convert financial leverage into long-term defence access while avoiding overt military confrontation. Understanding this model is crucial for anticipating similar developments in regions with high Korean strategic stakes.

China’s Djibouti Expansion: From Debt Diplomacy to Military Presence

Djibouti’s geographical location has drawn major powers for centuries, it currently hosting US, French, Japanese, and Italian facilities. China entered through BRI-aligned infrastructure financing, investing over $1.4 billion and becoming the state’s largest creditor. Key projects such as the Addis Ababa–Djibouti railway, locked Djibouti into dependency on Chinese capital and logistics networks.

Research suggests Djibouti’s debt vulnerability reduced its bargaining position and empowered Beijing to secure long-term strategic access. By 2017, the PLA Navy inaugurated the People’s Liberation Army Support Base in Djibouti (PLASB) —which was its first acknowledged overseas facility.

Chinese military literature frames such basing rights as essential to protecting China’s overseas interests including anti-piracy deployments and patrolling commercial sea lanes. However, Western and regional analysts argue that logistics support is only one dimension; the base provides a permanent force projection hub.

Djibouti’s leadership continues to emphasise its sovereignty, arguing it balances external powers for national benefit. Yet, the political situation shifted as economic reliance constrained the idea of optionality, a pattern visible in other BRI-linked states.

Maritime Strategic Impact: Blue-Water Capacity and Legal Realities

The PLASB has materially improved China’s sustainment and operational reach:

Enhanced Naval Reach

The base supports replenishment, repair, intelligence operations, and amphibious logistics that enable:

• Longer-duration blue-water deployments into the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean
• Escort, evacuation, and special forces operations far from mainland China
• Scalable force presence in crises

It forms part of a transition from coastal defence to expeditionary posture, representing the PLAN’s entry into great-power maritime competition.

 Militarised Infrastructure

Satellite analysis shows hardened shelters, deep-water pier expansions, and the capacity to host aircraft — capabilities beyond anti-piracy needs. This creates strategic uncertainty, particularly amid US–China rivalry in the region.

Legal Constraints and Strategic Risks

Hosting a foreign base introduces dilemmas for Djibouti:

• Would it risk severe conflict on its soil in a great-power confrontation?
• How does it ensure sovereign oversight of Chinese military operations?
• What recourse exists against unilateral force deployment?

The legal permissibility of overseas bases under international law is recognised, but their operational use remains politically contested. And Djibouti’s reduced leverage over Chinese activity increases uncertainty for regional maritime stability.

Wider Pattern: Beyond Djibouti

Djibouti is not an anomaly, as there are other cases of Chinese economic influence being put on other countries, resulting in the benefit for its military.