해양 중견국으로서의 한국

Abstract

South Korea has the potential to become a leading maritime middle power, at least in the Indo-Pacific region. This would allow the country to match in the maritime domain the level of influence that it exercises in other areas. To this end, South Korea, above all, needs to take a more assertive stance towards China’s actions in its neighborhood and also deepen cooperation with countries across Southeast Asia. Considering the naval capabilities that South Korea has at its disposal along with the capabilities that it plans to develop, including in cooperation with the United States, the country should be able to significantly boost its centrality to regional and, potentially, global maritime security..

Introduction

South Korea is one of the most consequential middle powers of the 21st century. The country is one of the ten largest trading nations, one of the leaders in frontier technologies from semiconductors to humanoid robotics, Asia’s top cultural powerhouse, and an increasingly relevant diplomatic voice. On top of that, the strength of South Korea’s military and defense industry sector has made it a sought-after military partner and a top arms exporter.

There is one area, however, where South Korea punches well below its weight: maritime security. Understandably, successive South Korean governments and the ROK Armed Forces have focused their security strategy on the biggest threat facing the country: North Korea. This has therefore resulted in South Korea prioritizing its army, especially, and air forces. The navy has therefore received less priority and funding compared to the other branches of the armed forces.

Yet, the prioritization of land and air forces has rested on an implicit understanding that the U.S. Navy would anchor free sea lanes, which are crucial for South Korea’s export-oriented economy, and that North Korea was the only threat that South Korean leaders had to focus on. None of these two axioms hold anymore though. The Donald Trump administration has made it clear that it expects its allies and partners to step up not only to deal with the direct security threats that they face, but also to address other security issues as the United States focuses on the Americas and China. Meanwhile, China has become a security threat that South Korea needs to contend with. This includes the maritime domain, as the People’s Liberation Army conducts military activities in the West Sea in spite of South Korea’s disagreement with them, Chinese entities build structures in this same sea without regard to South Korea’s exclusive economic zone, Chinese fishing vessels enter South Korean territorial waters while accompanied by the China Coast Guard, China disrupts freedom of navigation in the South China Sea—a vital sea lane for South Korean trade—and the Chinese government threatens to launch a war on the Taiwan Strait that would have catastrophic consequences for the South Korean economy.

Given its growing profile as a middle power, Washington’s push for its allies to become more involved in global security affairs, and, especially, the direct threat that Beijing poses to Seoul’s maritime security, South Korea needs to boost its role as a military actor in the maritime domain. South Korean partners certainly expect this, including Australia, Canada, Europe, Japan and countries across Southeast Asia. While South Korea does not necessarily need to develop a blue-water navy with global reach in the short term, it certainly needs to become a more active actor in the Indo-Pacific as soon as feasible. This would be a first step towards eventually developing a blue-water navy with a truly global dimension.

South Korea as a military middle power

South Korea is one of the strongest militaries and defense powers globally. Certainly, the ROK Armed Forces cannot compete with their U.S. or Chinese counterparts. But then, nobody can compete with them. According to the Military Balance and the Military Strength Ranking, both of them last published earlier this year, South Korea has one of the ten largest and most powerful armed forces globally. In Asia, only China and India have bigger and stronger militaries. Thus, South Korean policy-makers and military leaders can credibly argue that their country’s armed forces make the country a middle power at least in terms of capabilities.

In terms of activities, however, the picture of South Korea’s use of its military power beyond the deterrence of a North Korean attack has been mixed. South Korea has certainly contributed to public goods such as peacekeeping. The ROK Armed Forces have also been deployed in support of U.S.-led operations in the Vietnam, Gulf, Afghanistan and Iraq wars. And Ukraine would have found it difficult to fend off Russia’s invasion without South Korean artillery shells and indirect arms transfers. In contrast, however, South Korea has only become a significant arms exporter over the past decade. And, most notably, South Korea has been reluctant to participate in freedom of navigation operations and, sometimes, in joint naval training exercises.

The ROK Navy may receive fewer resources than the country’s army and air forces, but it is one of the most formidable in Asia and globally. According to the Military Balance and the World Directory of Modern Military Warships, both published in recent months, China has the biggest and strongest navy in Asia, with India, Indonesia, Japan and South Korea vying for the second position in the continent. Regardless of where one would place South Korea in this ranking, it is clear that the ROK Navy is no minnow by regional and global standards. It certainly towers over the Korean People’s Navy, its main foe.

Furthermore, the Lee Jae-myung government has signed an agreement with the United States to jointly build nuclear-powered submarines. Meanwhile, the ROK Navy has announced plans to develop a drone carrier fleet. At the same time, discussions about building an aircraft carrier—on top of the drone carrier fleet—are ongoing. This signals that South Korea wants to develop a more advanced navy with a wide range of capabilities. Coupled with its existing capabilities, this explains why South Korea can be considered a military middle power in the maritime domain as in terms of capabilities. Seoul now needs to match this position with its actions.

The need for more words and actions in the Indo-Pacific

South Korea is an Indo-Pacific power. Thus, this should be the main area of concern for South Korean policy-makers and the main theatre of operation of the ROK Navy. To begin with, Seoul should become more vocal in censuring Chinese activities across the region. Certainly, the Moon Jae-in and Yoon Suk-yeol governments were willing to condemn Chinese assertiveness in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea in joint statements issued together with the United States or, in the case of the Yoon government, both with the United States alone or with the United States and Japan. The Lee government seems to be following in the steps of its two predecessors.

Yet, Seoul may need to consider condemning Chinese actions in the West Sea along with its assertiveness in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Beijing’s infrastructure building, territorial claims, naval exercises or military jet flights across these three areas cannot be separated from each other. They are part of a broader campaign by the Chinese government to assert dominance over its neighborhood based on questionable historical claims and pressing strategic needs. Successive South Korean governments have generally been reluctant to call out China for its actions in the West Sea, even if they directly affect South Korean security and sovereignty. Condemning these actions as part of a broader campaign from Beijing may work better in this respect. In addition, or alternatively, South Korea’s white defense and diplomatic white papers could clearly state Seoul’s concerns.

At a more practical level, South Korea should become more active in joint naval exercises and freedom of navigation operations targeting the threat coming from China. In spite of the erratic behavior of the Trump administration towards allies, Seoul and Washington continue to share a concern over the Chinese government’s territorial claims and actions to assert them. Several other countries share these concerns, including Australia, Japan, Taiwan and most of Southeast Asia. South Korea should increase the number of joint multilateral naval exercises that it participates in. In particular, the number of trilateral exercises involving the United States and Japan should be increased, as they support interoperability and confidence building among the three navies.

In addition, South Korea has been reluctant to dispatch the ROK Navy to participate in freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. While freedom of navigation operations through the Taiwan Strait may be deemed a step too far by the Lee government, joining this type of operations across the South China Sea along with the U.S. and other navies would signal South Korea’s adherence to a core principle of international law. In fact, South Korea’s reluctance to participate in this type of operations may become untenable as the Trump administration requests U.S. allies to step up.

Building capacity across Southeast Asia

Several Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore or Vietnam regularly express their concerns about Chinese actions in the South China Sea, as well as in the Philippine Sea in the case of the Philippines. South Korea has a good working relationship with the navies of countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam. With the U.S. taking a more transactional approach to its foreign relations and becoming more demanding of third countries, there is a window of opportunity for South Korea to become more central to capacity building in Southeast Asia.

Capacity building involves fleet modernization. The Philippines is already relying on South Korea as part of its military upgrading process. Vietnam is also expanding its defense ties with South Korea, along with shipbuilding industry cooperation. Meanwhile, Indonesia and Singapore have also shown their interest in expanding defense cooperation with South Korea. Seoul needs to seize this opportunity and aggressively pursue opportunities such as frigate, corvette and patrol vessel delivery and maintenance, radar, sonar and other surveillance systems upgrading or special defense equipment sales. South Korea is considered a trusted partner across Southeast Asia, and has the expertise and industrial capacity to deliver these systems. It should be a cornerstone of its strategy to attain middle power status in the maritime security domain. In addition, South Korea should increase the number of capacity building activities such as naval and coast guard officer training.

In addition, capacity building should also involve expertise and information sharing on issues not directly related to China, such as anti-piracy, counterterrorism or post-natural disaster recovery activities. This would serve to open the door to deeper cooperation between the ROK Navy—and, in some cases, Coast Guard—and its Southeast Asian counterparts. Eventually, this could facilitate access to naval bases in the region for the ROK Navy. In turn, this would make it easier for South Korea to carry out the list of activities mentioned above.

Conclusion

South Korea is a middle power with a strong set of assets and a growing presence in global affairs. Maritime security, however, is one area in which South Korea is yet to become a fully recognized middle power. This is not related to Seoul’s capabilities. Rather, it is related to South Korean actions. In short, South Korea is not as active in the military domain as it could be when considering the strength of the ROK Navy in particular and the country’s military more generally.

The Lee government can take several actions to transform South Korea into a recognized middle power in the maritime domain. Particularly in the Indo-Pacific, the region where South Korea holds more influence. They include greater assertiveness vis-a-vis China via condemnation of its actions, joint naval exercises with the United States and others, and freedom of navigation operations also with other partners. In addition, South Korea should deepen ties with Southeast Asia by supporting its capacity building, including fleet modernization, officer training, and expertise and information sharing. By engaging in these actions, South Korea will become the type of maritime actor that the country’s partners expect it to be.