북극: 새로운 개척지

Abstract

In 2025, when Donald Trump returned to the White House, the most heated global topic was undoubtedly Greenland. Along with tariff conflicts, NATO had to go through another internal friction between the U.S. and Europe over this Danish territory. Meanwhile, Russia and China have increased their presence in the Arctic region through security and economic partnership. While numerous Euro-Atlantic experts have raised concerns about Arctic security, fewer studies have been conducted from an Indo-Pacific perspective. However, as the South Korean President Lee Jae-myung pledged his commitment to the Arctic, attention toward the North beyond the Korean Peninsula is slowly but steadily emerging. This article examines the significance of the Arctic for South Korea, analyzes what obstacles stand before Seoul’s ambitions, and projects South Korea’s future role in the age of Arctic competition.

Introduction

In 2018, China claimed itself a ‘near-Arctic state’ through China’s Arctic Policy White Paper. The declaration reflected China’s intent to participate in Arctic affairs despite its distance from the region, claiming that polar climate change affects China in various ways. Arctic Council member states, of course, did not recognize such an audacious claim, and scholars and analysts viewed this ‘self-defined Arctic identity’ as a strategic attempt to expand Beijing’s influence in the region. Today, China is deepening its partnership with Russia, developing the “Polar Silk Road” project as part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

In 2025, Donald Trump explicitly expressed his ambition to acquire Greenland and called on Canada to become the 51^st state of the U.S. Although he was criticized by the media for his aggressive narratives, he had already raised the idea of acquiring Greenland during his first term. Repeatedly, Trump made it clear that Greenland holds a geopolitical significance for the national security of the U.S.

Although the world’s focus is heavily on Iran today, the Arctic is emerging as a new boxing ring for major superpowers. While South Korea is not an Arctic state, it is an observer state of the Arctic Council and shares interests with the member states either directly or indirectly. Despite its access constraints and other obstacles, South Korea should pay more attention to the Arctic not only for the economy, but also for its security.

Significance of the Arctic

The Arctic provides a more cost-efficient shipping route for Northeast Asia. For South Korea, the distance from Busan to Rotterdam in the Netherlands via the conventional route – through Southeast Asia, Malacca Strait, and the Suez Canal – is approximately 22,000 km, requiring roughly forty days of sailing. Today, the Arctic Route is still a limited option, as it can only be used during the summer season from July to November. However, if climate change continues and the Arctic ice continues to recede, rendering the Arctic Ocean increasingly ice-free, East Asian countries will put more focus toward the North rather than the South.

Although the availability of the Arctic Route is highly limited, recent events have raised the appeal of the Arctic as a potential alternative. On March 23, 2021, a container ship Ever Given ran aground in the middle of the Suez Canal and blocked the route for six days. More than four hundred ships were blocked, delayed, or stranded by this accident, and it took five additional days for the Canal to be cleared. Today, the war in and around Iran has effectively disrupted traffic through the Hormuz Strait, and countries dependent on Gulf oil and natural gas are experiencing significant economic disruptions. Although it will take decades for the Arctic Route to be competitive as conventional sea routes, it can serve as a viable alternative, especially during crises in the Middle East.

South Korea’s interest in the Arctic has dramatically grown under the Lee Jae-myung government. The Lee government allocated additional 550 billion won to the Ministry of Ocean and Fisheries (MOF) for the 2026 budget and initiated the Arctic Task Force to advance the commercialization of the Arctic Sea Route. In January 2026, the Ministry announced the first trial voyage from Busan to Rotterdam through the Arctic will be conducted in September.

One of the major goals of the Lee administration is to transform Busan into an international hub of harbor and transshipment. Ever since he was running for a presidential candidate, Lee pledged to move the MOF from Sejong – where the Government Complex is located – to Busan. Along with the relocation, both President Lee and Minister Chun Jae-soo have constantly expressed their ambition to make the Port of Busan an international trading hub by pioneering the Arctic Route. While some worry that the relocation will undermine inter-ministry cooperation, it still reflects the current government’s objective for making South Korea a new maritime power in the region by transforming a major maritime city into a hub of global trade.

What Should Be Considered?

While South Korea’s rising interest in the Arctic as well as current government’s effort deserve recognition, there are also concerns that need to be addressed prior to full commitment. Geopolitically, South Korea is at a highly sensitive location within the region, and the Arctic Route of South Korea will be under the influence of Russia, China, and even North Korea. Moreover, as the Route passes through the East Sea, a firm maritime security relationship between Seoul and Tokyo must also be guaranteed.

North Korea and Its Ballistic Missile Launches

The first risk South Korea’s Arctic Route will face is North Korea. Pyongyang periodically launches ballistic missiles toward the East Sea, either for military exercises or to send a political signal to the international community. In 2026 alone, Pyongyang launched its missiles a total of six times. The first launch was on January 4 – shortly after the U.S. captured Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela; the second launch was on January 27; the third launch was on March 14 – amidst the Freedom Shield, a joint military exercise of South Korea and the U.S.; and the fourth through sixth launches took place from April 7 to 8 – following President Lee’s expression of regret on April 6 over two civilian drone intrusion cases in September 2025 and January 2026.

Despite various analyses of related experts, Pyongyang’s motives and patterns remain difficult to discern, and this poses a serious risk for those who use this route. Given that many of North Korea’s test trajectories fall into waters that future Arctic-bound shipping would have to traverse, these launches directly affect the risk assessments of shipping and insurance companies. For a safe Arctic route, effective deterrence against North Korea and its missile provocations must be guaranteed.

In this respect, the Washington Declaration (April 2023) and the Spirit of Camp David (August 2023) have established the foundation. The extended deterrence of the U.S. and the South Korea-U.S.-Japan trilateral partnership can be two key pillars of Arctic Route security; and yet the relationship between South Korea and Japan has a long way to go for stronger ties.

Dokdo Dispute and ADIZ Jurisdiction

Although South Korea’s relationship with Japan is not as hostile as before, they still share uncomfortable issues in the East Sea. Starting from the name of the sea itself, as Japan calls the Sea of Japan, the Dokdo – Takeshima for Japan – still remains as a major cause of conflict. In December 2018, Japan accused a South Korean destroyer of directing fire-control radar at its maritime patrol aircraft, which escalated into a diplomatic conflict until 2024.

In 2019, South Korea and Japan clashed once again over their respective military responses. On July 23, a Russian surveillance aircraft and two Chinese bombers entered the Korean Air Defense Identification Zone (KADIZ). The South Korean Air Force responded by deploying two fighter jets, one of which fired flares and warning shots to intercept the intrusion. While Seoul criticized Moscow and Beijing, Tokyo blamed South Korea along with Russia. For Japan, Dokdo – Takeshima – is its territory, hence South Korean Air Force operations within its claimed aerial jurisdiction are unacceptable. Even though the territorial intrusion was carried out by Russia and China, the ensuing dispute emerged between South Korea and Japan.

Geographically, even if the route begins near the South Korean Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), it will transit through the northern part of Japan’s EEZ. Despite complex historical sentiments and ongoing disputes, South Korea must strengthen its ties with Japan not only for the Arctic Route but also for broader regional security – including Taiwan.

Taiwan Strait for a Safer Sea Route

Security in the Taiwan Strait must also be guaranteed for Busan to become the final port before the Arctic. Today, Shanghai has the largest port in Asia, connecting Asia and Europe through the Malacca Strait and the Suez Canal. Although Shanghai is located above the Taiwan Strait by latitude, Beijing has the capability to manage this risk, as it is itself a direct stakeholder in the Taiwan issue. As can be witnessed by the Hormuz crisis, Busan cannot be a regional hub if not connected to Southeast Asia. If Southeast Asian routes are disrupted, Busan will not be able to function as the last port linking the Indo-Pacific and the Arctic Route. If an actual clash between China and Taiwan occurs, the main artery of East Asia could become a chokepoint, severing access to Southeast Asia and the Arctic.

Seoul must be prudent when dealing with the Taiwan issue. As a U.S. ally, Seoul can reasonably be expected to follow U.S. security policy in a broad sense. However, China is still an important partner both in terms of proximity, economic interdependence, and even security. Shanghai will be the last stop before Busan, and Beijing is one of the most effective leverages to control Pyongyang for keeping the Route safe. In sum, South Korea needs China as much as it needs the U.S. when it comes to Arctic engagement.

Projected Impact

Accelerated Shipbuilding and Nuclear-Powered Submarine Cooperation

The Research Vessel Araon (RV Araon) is the only icebreaker South Korea operates, traveling to both North and South Poles for research purposes. On July 29, 2025, the MOF announced that Hanwha Ocean will build a next generation icebreaker by 2029. Despite its internationally recognized shipbuilding capabilities, South Korea has yet to establish a leading position in icebreaker technology. Russia is notably the leading power, operating a fleet of over 40 icebreakers including nuclear-powered icebreakers, and Finland is the leading country of advanced icebreaker technology.

South Korea-U.S. shipbuilding cooperation could also extend to icebreaker manufacturing. The U.S. has only three icebreakers that are active, and recently ordered six more from Finland. Through the shipbuilding cooperation, South Korea and the U.S. can build their own vessels necessary for Arctic activities, and the maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) of these vessels will further strengthen bilateral ties. Despite the criticism that the shipbuilding cooperation is a time-consuming effort with no immediate returns, the agreement itself secures the institutional foundation upon which both Seoul and Washington will uphold their commitments.

In addition to the shipbuilding cooperation, South Korea’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines (SSN) will be another driver that can boost Seoul’s Arctic ambition. In October 2025, during the APEC Summit, President Trump approved South Korea’s SSN project, and the official agreement was finalized in the following month. As President Lee Jae-myung mentioned during the Summit, the major purpose of SSN will be on improving tracking capabilities against North Korean and Chinese vessels. According to current timeline, Seoul plans to acquire SSN in the mid-2030s, and the regional dynamics around the Korean Peninsula are likely to differ significantly from those of today. The SSN has the potential to expand its role in protecting the Arctic Route in the East as an effective deterrent against North Korea.

Stronger Trilateral Cooperation and Extended Deterrence Against the Anti-West Alignment

As South Korea expands its scope of activities, the scope of security must also be expanded. As briefly aforementioned, the extended deterrence under the Washington Declaration and the trilateral cooperation under the Spirit of Camp David will serve Seoul’s ambition toward the North. They can also encourage South Korea to broaden its security commitments beyond the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, where Seoul’s focus has traditionally been concentrated.

Such efforts, however, already lag behind the growing alignment and cooperation between China and Russia. Under the so-called Sino-Russian “no-limits” partnership, both China and Russia are increasing their presence in the Arctic: as part of China’s Polar Silk Road initiative, Beijing and Moscow are transporting Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) and minerals to China through the Northern Sea Route (NSR); they are also conducting joint naval patrols in the North Pacific, raising U.S. and its Indo-Pacific allies’ concerns. With Russia’s dominant number of icebreakers and China’s rapidly growing naval presence combined, the Sino-Russian partnership will grow into a grave threat to the U.S. and its allies.

While there are numerous analyses and articles urging stronger NATO alliance as a counter force against Russia in the Arctic, especially along with the recent Greenland discourse, there are not enough studies on the impact of Sino-Russian Arctic collaboration on the Indo-Pacific. In this regard, the trilateral cooperation has a strong potential to become a powerful deterrent against the anti-West alignment – China, Russia, and North Korea. Although South Korea and Japan are not direct stakeholders of the Arctic affairs as the Arctic Council members, they are both important U.S. allies in the northern hemisphere of the Indo-Pacific. If Beijing’s claim of the “near Arctic state” continues, despite the lack of global recognition, the same logic could be applied to the interests of South Korea and Japan, especially under the spectrum of the new Arctic Route in Asia. While the South Korea-U.S.-Japan ties are not a multilateral alliance as NATO in the Euro-Atlantic, the Arctic Route will provide stronger impetus for collaboration – not only to counter Russia and China, but also to deepen alignment with Europe.

South Korea’s Presence in the Euro-Atlantic

The Russian invasion of Ukraine triggered the need for inter-regional cooperation between the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic. South Korea was the second-largest supporter of Ukraine after the U.S., outpacing any European state in the provision of weapons and munitions; and North Korea is the only direct player physically involved in the war by sending military troops. Seoul’s weapon support to Kyiv and Pyongyang-Moscow ties prove that a war in one region affects another, and the Arctic will foster such inter-relations even further.

Other than the war in Ukraine, South Korea has already been involved in European affairs: it is an observer state to NATO and is regularly invited to its summits; and since 2002, South Korea has been running Dasan Arctic Research Station in Svalbard Islands, Norway. The Arctic Route will be another access to Europe, and it can also draw European attention to the Indo-Pacific affairs – especially Chinese Arctic activities and North Korean threat.

South Korea’s presence in Europe will reinforce the U.S. alliance not only bilaterally, but also minilaterally and multilaterally. Beyond South Korea, the U.S. treaty allies in the Indo-Pacific include Japan, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand. In the event of U.S. absence, they are vulnerable to threats, as the U.S. maintains a “hub-and-spoke” structure rather than a multilateral alliance like NATO. The Arctic Route will strengthen security ties between thirty NATO states in Europe and the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) – South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Given its alliance with the U.S., advanced shipbuilding capability, and growing Arctic agenda, South Korea is well positioned to act as a key connector between NATO and the Indo-Pacific. In practical terms, this could mean more regular joint exercises, information-sharing on Arctic and North Pacific activities, and coordinated sanctions enforcement against actors that threaten the stability of the Arctic region. The IP4-NATO cooperation will give more space for Washington to focus on its own security priorities, and it serves one of the objectives of the U.S. National Security Strategy – burden sharing.

Conclusion

In the near future, when the sea routes in the North open for good, the Iron Curtain that had divided Europe could descend once again, this time in the Arctic, creating a new strategic fault line between NATO and the Russia-China alignment. While the U.S. can secure its presence in the Euro-Atlantic with NATO, there is no U.S. ally in the Indo-Pacific with an Arctic presence. For the U.S., Alaska holds strategic importance in the North Pacific, and Washington will need Seoul and Tokyo to effectively secure the region.

Until today, South Korea continues to carry the legacy of the twentieth-century Cold War, confronting North Korea and its nuclear threat. As the world returns to a Cold War-like era, the new Iron Curtain will certainly affect the two-Koreas relations. If China and Russia come to dominate the Arctic region, the balance of power between Seoul and Pyongyang is likely to shift accordingly; but if the U.S. and its allies can deter the anti-West alignment effectively, South Korea will be able to extend its influence in the Korean Peninsula, the Indo-Pacific, and the Euro-Atlantic. The Arctic is a bridge that connects the Inter-Korean dynamics and global security. In an era of power and strength, South Korea should deepen its Arctic commitment.